Subsidizing Inequality: Performance Pay and Risk Selection in Medicare by Fioretti, Michele & Wang, Hongming





PERFORMANCE PAY AND RISK 
SELECTION IN MEDICARE 
Michele Fioretti and Hongming Wang 





Performance Pay and Risk Selection in Medicare*
Michele Fioretti† Hongming Wang‡
November, 2019
Abstract
Pay-for-performance is commonly employed to improve the quality of social ser-
vices contracted out to firms. We show that insurer responses to pay-for-performance
can widen the inequality in accessing social services. Focusing on the U.S. Medi-
care Advantage market, we find that high-quality insurance contracts responded to
quality-linked payments by selecting healthier enrollees with premium differences
across counties. The selection is profitable because the quality rating fails to adjust for
pre-existing health differences of enrollees. As a result, quality improved mostly due
to selection, and the supply of high-quality insurance shifted to the healthiest counties.
Revising the quality rating could prevent these unintended consequences.
JEL classifications: I13, I14, L15
Keywords: pay-for-performance, Quality Bonus Payment demonstration, Medicare
Advantage, risk selection, supply-side selection, quality ratings, health inequality
*We would like to thank Ghazala Azmat, Aaron Baum, Zach Brown, Moshe Buchinsky, Alice Chen,
Golvine De Rochembau, Emeric Henry, Aljoscha Janssen, Bora Kim, Marleen Marra, Daria Pelech, Geert
Ridder, Alejandro Robinson-Corte´s, Mark Shepard, Andre Veiga, Gianluca Violante and participants of the
2018 ASHECON, the 2019 IIOC and at seminars at the University of Southern California and Sciences Po for
helpful comments and discussions.
†Department of Economics, Sciences Po. email: michele.fioretti@sciencespo.fr
‡Center for Global Economic Systems, Hitotsubashi University. email: hongming.wang@r.hit-u.ac.jp
1 Introduction
Economists have long praised the benefits of markets. Competition can lower market prices
while improving quality. Market-based approaches are increasingly popular means to re-
duce inefficiencies in the provision of public goods. One of them, the pay-for-performance
model is found in a range of settings, from hospitalization (Gupta, 2017) to education
(Biasi, 2018) and tax collection (Khan et al., 2015). In pay-for-performance, firms receive a
quality rating of their services, and payments are directly linked to the quality rating. In
principle, the financial incentives can spur firms to invest in the service quality. In reality,
however, pay-for-performance can direct resources away from actual improvements in
quality, if the design of the quality rating is badly aligned with the quality initiative.
The design of the quality rating is especially critical in selection markets such as
the insurance market. Here, service quality depends directly on the match between the
needs, or type, of consumers and the service offered (Veiga and Weyl, 2016). As a result,
pay-for-performance can create additional incentives to screen consumers if servicing
certain consumer types worsens the quality rating. The selection response can distort the
quality rating linked to payments, and have large adverse effects on consumers. In health
insurance markets, for example, selection on enrollee characteristics like pre-existing
conditions or ethnicity (Bauhoff, 2012) can reduce access to care for those who need it the
most, ultimately widening health inequality (e.g., Chetty et al., 2016, Currie and Schwandt,
2016). Yet, we know little about the ways insurers internalize pay-for-performance, or the
effect of insurers’ responses on the quality rating, payments, and enrollees.
This paper shows how insurers respond to pay-for-performance by exploiting the
introduction of the Quality Bonus Payment demonstration (henceforth QBP) in the U.S.
Medicare program, which is transitioning to pay-for-performance (Burwell, 2015).1 QBP
tied insurers’ subsidies to the quality of their services.2 The same quality measures used
to rank insurance contracts were already available to enrollees before QBP. Therefore, in
this setting, we can credibly identify insurers’ responses to pay-for-performance because
QBP shifted the supply of insurance without directly affecting demand.
We apply this intuition empirically and find that insurers with high-quality ratings
served less risky enrollees after QBP. These insurance contracts selected healthier enrollees
by lowering premiums in healthier, low-risk counties and by raising it in riskier ones. The
selection incentive originates from the design of the quality rating which fails to adjust for
1Medicare is the program providing health insurance to over 49 million elderly Americans. The program
currently costs the U.S. government $705 bn annually, or 20% of total health expenditure (CMS, 2016).
2The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that QBP will cost the federal government $8.35
billion over ten years, more than all other Medicare demonstrations combined since 1995 (CBO, 2012).
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pre-existing health differences related to chronic diseases like diabetes and hypertension.
As a result, over 70% of the health improvements after QBP is due to risk selection rather
than value-added. The selection response substantially inflated the subsidies to selecting
insurers, and shifted the distribution of good quality insurance to the healthiest counties,
showcasing the challenges of designing quality-based payment incentives to insurers.
Our empirical strategy exploits two features of the payment reform. First, QBP in-
troduced variation in bonus payments based on contracts’ quality ratings. In particular,
we distinguish between contracts of high and low quality according to an institutional
feature of the policy. Second, although contracts already received quality ratings before
the QBP demonstration, quality was not a factor in the payment model. Therefore in a
difference-in-differences framework, we estimate intent-to-treat effects on contracts differ-
entiated by baseline quality ratings. To explore the mechanisms of selection, we extend
the framework to examine premium differences across counties with different levels of
risk for potential enrollees. We also quantify the impact of selection on the quality rating
using instrumental variables derived from our findings.
We find a substantial improvement in the risk pool of high-quality contracts, as mea-
sured by risk scores. The decrease in risk scores is not associated with other differential
effects on the average price levels or service area characteristics between high- and low-
quality contracts. Risk scores decreased even more in high-quality contracts already
enrolling low-risk individuals in the baseline – in these “high-selection” contracts, risk
scores dropped by 4-8 percentage points. This suggests that QBP incentivized insurers to
select enrollees based on risk. We next ask both how firms screened enrollees and why.
To address how selection happened, we examine the pricing strategy of insurers across
counties. We find that premiums for prescription drug coverage increased significantly
with county risk scores in high-quality contracts, but not in low-quality contracts. For
every ten percentage point increase in the county risk score, drug premiums increased by
$1.70 per month in high-quality contracts after the reform, or 7% above the mean. We
show that premiums responded directly to the health of enrollee across counties, but not
to local socio-economic factors, market concentration, or the cost and quality of healthcare,
confirming that demand and supply factors external to risk are not driving the premium
differences over risk scores. We therefore conclude that high-quality contracts selected
healthier enrollees with premium differences across counties.
To understand why the payment demonstration incentivized the selection of healthier
individuals, the second half of the paper delves into the design details of the quality rating.
In a stylized model, we show that a negative correlation between risk and quality makes
healthier individuals more profitable to insurers under quality-adjusted payments. Em-
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pirically, we document a negative correlation between risk scores and the health outcome
measures most weighted in the quality rating. These measures rank contracts based on
health improvements over time, but fail to adjust for pre-existing health differences at the
time of enrollment. As such, healthier enrollees are associated with better ratings, and
contracts with greater improvements in the risk pool also experienced greater relative
gains in the health outcome rating. These results suggest a role of risk selection in the
gaming of quality ratings and payments.
We correct for selected risk scores in the measurement of quality using an instrumental
variable strategy, and calculate the financial gains of selection to insurers. We allow the
quality rating to depend on the risk composition of contracts, and decompose the rating
gains after QBP into a selection component and a value-added component. Building on
our analysis of the selection mechanism, we instrument the risk composition of contracts
using premium differences across counties. We confirm that the health outcome ratings
were subject to substantial gaming by insurers, with selection accounting for 77% of the
rating improvements in high-selection contracts. Removing the selection gains would
downgrade the overall rating of most high-selection contracts by 0.5 to 1 star in 2014 (out
of 5 stars). Selection costs Medicare $51.7 million in 2014, or 13% of the bonus payments.
The selection response has large distributional impacts on enrollees. Since average
premiums and enrollee benefits did not differ by quality, premium differences to select
healthier enrollees led to subsidies from high-risk counties to low-risk counties. This
allowed high-quality insurers to fully capture the selection gains as profits. As a result,
market shares of high-quality contracts polarized across county risk scores. In the lowest-
risk counties, high-selection contracts lowered monthly premiums by over $13 per ten
percentage point decrease in the risk score. Moving from the bottom to the top 15% of
county risk scores, high-quality contracts increased monthly premiums by $6.50, and
decreased market shares by almost 13 percentage points. Therefore selection shifted the
supply of high-quality insurance away from the riskiest counties, worsening the regional
disparities in healthcare access in the U.S.
Our analysis identifies several aspects of the rating design which contributed to the
selection response of insurers. To contain the selection incentive, we suggest risk-adjusting
or down-weighting outcome measures in the quality rating. Since no risk-adjustment
guideline exists for the outcome measures, we propose one approach that adjusts for
selected risk scores using some knowledge of the selection mechanism by firms. Besides,
we suggest designing quality ratings at the level of small geographic markets rather than
contract service areas – the latter gives rise to the cross-space selection response in the
current setting. For contracts covering many markets, a localized rating is also more
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informative to enrollees.
This paper is related to a large literature on pay-for-performance. Our key findings are
consistent with the theoretical insight that payment incentives based on biased measures
of performance distort effort (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991, Baker 1992). In relation
to the empirical literature on healthcare, previous studies generally find small effects
of pay-for-performance on providers (Rosenthal and Frank 2006, Mullen et al. 2010),
with some evidence of patient selection (Shen 2003, Gupta 2017) and strategic reporting
(Gravelle et al. 2010) in the case of outcome-based performance measures. We add to this
literature by providing the first evidence on how insurers respond to pay-for-performance
incentives, and the distortionary effects of these responses on prices and consumer access.
This paper is also related to the literature on the effects of risk adjustment in health
insurance markets (e.g., Newhouse et al. 2015, Breyer et al. 2011). Ideally, risk adjustment
makes different enrollee types equally profitable to insurers. In practice, selection may still
occur post-adjustment over the residual variation in profitability created by the adjustment
formula (Brown et al. 2014, Geruso et al. 2019, Carey 2017, Lavetti and Simon 2018). This
paper suggests that the residual variation is a small price to pay relative to the systematic
variation in profitability favoring healthier enrollees in the absence of risk adjustments on
quality. The scale of the selection response and the aggregate effects illustrates the critical
role of risk adjustment for the functioning of health insurance markets.3
More broadly, this paper contributes to the literature on the regional disparities in
health spending (Skinner, 2011), prices (Cooper et al., 2018), and health outcomes (Dick-
man et al., 2017) in the U.S. We complement the vast and descriptive evidence by highlight-
ing one particular mechanism affecting disparities, namely the gaming of public subsidies
by private insurers. This finding reveals that supply-side regulations play important roles
in shaping the regional disparities of healthcare, with particular implications for social
insurance programs contracted out to private entities.4 Insurer gaming in these programs
not only leads to the capture of subsidies (Cabral et al., 2018, Duggan et al., 2016, Curto
et al., 2014) and price distortions (Decarolis, 2015, Decarolis et al., 2015), but has large
unintended consequences on the distribution of benefits across consumer demographics
and geography (Polyakova and Ryan, 2019).
Taken together, our results cast doubts on the effectiveness of pay-for-performance in
3Risk adjustments can also trigger the strategic coding of risk scores above the actuarial risks of enrollees
(Geruso and Layton, 2018). We consider potential biases from coding intensity when analyzing the selection
responses of insurers across space.
4Effects of supply-side factors on health disparities can also be learned from mover designs that separate
such effects from patient demand characteristics (e.g., Finkelstein et al., 2016, 2019, Deryugina and Molitor,
2018). Exploiting a supply shock, we identify payment incentives as one particular supply-side channel that
drives disparities, with direct implications for policy.
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health insurance markets. Intended to promote high-value services while cutting costs,
quality bonus payments in Medicare led to only modest improvements in health outcomes.
Insurers exploited the design of the quality rating by selecting healthier enrollees and
by subsidizing premiums in low-risk counties with higher prices in riskier counties. The
selection resulted in large overpayments to insurers, and shifted the distribution of high-
quality insurance to the healthiest counties. In the rest of the paper we examine the
efficiency and equity implications of the subsidy design, and suggest ways to improve the
quality rating based on our analyses.
2 Quality Ratings and Payments in Medicare Advantage
When looking for health insurance, all Americans 65 years of age or older can choose
between receiving the traditional, or public, Medicare coverage or purchase additional
coverage privately through Medicare Advantage (MA). Since the inception of the MA
program in the 1980s, MA enrollment has grown to 33% of the Medicare population in
2017, with over 2,000 MA plans providing Medicare insurance to 18.9 million beneficiaries.
Also referred to as the “Part C” coverage, MA contracts offer at least the same benefits as
the traditional Medicare,5 and typically offer more generous benefits and supplemental
coverages. For example, the vast majority of MA contracts offer prescription drug coverage
(called “Part D”),6 and have lower enrollee cost sharing than the traditional Medicare.
Private insurers contract with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
to offer MA insurance plans. To assist beneficiaries in making informed plan choices, CMS
provides quality ratings of MA contracts over a wide range of performance measures. In
the early 2000s, ratings of selected measures were included in the “Medicare and You”
handbook mailed to Medicare eligibles. In 2007, CMS adopted a 5-star rating metric of
quality. In 2009, CMS started publishing overall star ratings in addition to ratings of
individual measures. The overall ratings were computed from measure ratings for Part C
and Part D coverage separately. In 2011, CMS instituted an overall star rating combining
the Part C and D measures, which became the basis of bonus payments from 2012 onward.
Ratings of individual measures are revised annually according to the percentile ranks
of contracts. Although MA contracts have multiple plan offerings, all plans share the same
quality rating at the level of the contract. For most measures, the performance bar of
5Medicare Part A covers hospital costs. Part B covers outpatient and other medical costs not covered in
Part A. In Medicare Advantage plans, Part A and Part B benefits are offered under the Part C coverage.
6Prescription drug coverage is available to FFS enrollees through a stand-alone health plan in the Part D
program. Almost all MA contracts offer at least one MA-PD plan with integrated Part D coverage.
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a given star rating increases over years.7 The underlying information of quality comes
from a variety of administrative and survey records, collected from different samples over
multiple periods. For instance, health outcome measures in the year-t rating are based on
clinical records of enrollees in year t − 2, whereas patient complaints measures are based
on complaint resolution in the first half of year t −1. Appendix Table A39 and A40 list the
data source and the sample period of all measures in the 2013 star rating.
Individual ratings are aggregated to the overall star rating through a weighting proce-
dure. All individual measures received equal weights in 2009-11. Starting in 2012, health
outcome measures receive 3.0 weights in the overall rating, access and patient satisfaction
measures receive 1.5 weights, and process measures concerning screening and primary
care visits receive 1.0 weights.8 A small bonus is added to contracts with low variances
across the measure ratings. The weighted average plus the bonus is rounded to the nearest
star rating shown to enrollees on a scale from 2.0 to 5.0 stars at half-star increments.
Although quality disclosure in principle improves choice quality and market function-
ing,9 previous research in the Medicare context has found modest demand side responses
to quality ratings (Dafny and Dranove 2008, Reid et al. 2013, Li and Doshi 2016). Using
the discontinuity in the overall rating near rounding cut-offs, Darden and McCarthy (2015)
finds reduced enrollments in low-rated contracts below 3.0 stars in 2009, but no effect in
2010. The null effect in the second year of the rating disclosure is potentially due to supply
side pricing responses (McCarthy and Darden, 2017), or due to consumer inattention to
quality information after the policy phase-in.10
2.1 The Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration
Payments to MA plans are determined by comparing the plan’s asking price (bid) with
the benchmark set by CMS. The bid (denoted b) reflects the projected cost of an average
enrollee in the plan plus an administrative load. The bid is evaluated against a plan-
7The measure ‘Access to Primary Care Doctor”, for example, is dropped in 2013 because nearly all MA
plans met high-quality standards (above 85% for 4.0 star and 95% for 5.0 star), and the measure “Plan
All-Cause (30-day) Re-Admission” revised the threshold for 5.0 rating from below 5% in 2012 to below 3%
in 2013; only a handful of local coordinated care plans (CCP) with very small enrollments ever obtained 5.0
rating on this measure.
8CMS also publishes domain-level ratings where individual measures are grouped into 5 Part C domains
and 4 Part D domains. For our analysis, we mainly exploit the weight change which differentially varied
the financial return to improving measure ratings across the three weighting categories. The weights of
measures in the 2013 rating are listed in Appendix Table A39 and A40.
9In particular, Glazer and McGuire (2006) show theoretically that a functioning quality reporting system
is as important as risk adjustment in correcting market inefficiencies.
10For example, a 2011 poll by Kaiser Permanente shows that almost 60% of Medicare eligible seniors are
unaware of the 5 Star Ratings (Harris Interactive, 2011).
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specific benchmark (B) constructed from county benchmarks weighted by enrollment. For
plans bidding below the benchmark, payment equals the plan’s bid and a rebate. The
rebate is passed on to enrollees as premium discounts or additional benefits. For plans
bidding above the benchmark, payment from CMS is capped at the benchmark, and the
difference is charged to enrollees as extra premiums. There is no rebate or additional
benefits to enrollees.
In an effort to link payments to the quality of care, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) –
signed into law in March, 2010 – introduced quality bonus payments to contracts rated
4.0 stars and above. The ACA payment model was scheduled to take effect in 2012. On
November 10th, 2010, CMS proposed the Quality Bonus Payment (QBP) demonstration
which increased bonus payments above the ACA levels and extended bonus payments to
lower-rated contracts below 4.0 stars. The demonstration covers the period 2012-2014.
Payments fully transitioned to the ACA model in 2015.11
The QBP rebate to consumers is determined through the following formula
rebate =
0 if b ≥ α
star ·B
τstar · (αstar ·B− b) if b < αstar ·B,
(1)
where the star rating affects rebate through bonuses on the benchmark αstar and the
rebate percent τstar . Prior to QBP, all contracts are subject to the same benchmark in a
county, and 75% of the bid below the benchmark is rebated to enrollees. QBP varied
both parameters with the star rating, awarding bonus benchmarks and higher rebate
percentages to high-quality contracts. Table 1 summarizes the policy change.
To a large extent, the generous bonus payments in QBP offset the payment cuts imple-
mented by the ACA. Starting in 2012, ACA revised the county benchmarks to more closely
match the spending levels in the fee-for-service Medicare.12 The bonus benchmarks more
than offset the base rate cut for median- to high-rated contracts.13 Similarly, the rebate
percent is reduced for all contracts, but adjusted higher for higher-rated contracts.
Other than the standard bonus payments awarded at the contract level, high-quality
contracts in “double bonus counties” are eligible for additional bonuses on the bench-
11The bonus payments to lower-rated contracts (below 4.0 stars) are discontinued after the transition.
12The new benchmarks ranged from 95% of fee-for-service spending in counties in the top quartile to
115% in those in the lowest quartile.
13Between 2010 and 2012, the mean (median) base benchmark across counties remained stable at $775
($750). Bonus-adjusted benchmark for 3-star contracts increased to $800 ($780) in 2012, and increased to
$805 ($785) for 4-star contracts. At the contract level, although the raw benchmark trended similarly by
quality, bonus-adjusted benchmarks increased more in high-quality contracts.
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mark.14 Layton and Ryan (2015) finds that the double benchmark bonuses are associated
with increased plan offerings but did not improve the average star ratings in these counties.
We control for location-specific benchmarks and benchmark bonuses in the cross-county
analyses of insurer responses.
3 Data
Our data come from the administrative registry of all MA-PD plans offered over 2009-2014
(the “Landscape File”). The data contain information on plan characteristics such as
premiums and drug deductibles across service areas (counties) covered by each plan. We
drop Regional Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) plans and contracts with missing
star ratings for payment purposes since different payment rules apply in these cases.
We further restrict the sample to plans covering both medical and prescription drug
expenditures, or the MA-PD plans. Details of the sample construction are available in
Appendix C.
Table 2 summarizes the estimation sample. Panel A looks at contract-year observations,
while Panel B expands the contract-year observations by the locations (counties) in the
contract’s service area. An average MA-PD contract offers 3.4 plans covering over 25
counties in the service area, consists of about 334.8 thousands enrollees yearly. Most
MA-PD contracts place bids below their benchmark by $110.7, earning its enrollees about
$ 78.4 in rebates per month. Finally, a large number of contracts offer zero premiums and
zero drug deductibles.
In the remaining sections of the paper we will look at how contracts of different quality
responded to QBP. Our main focus is on risk selection. We first show that contracts
with greater quality improved their risk pool more than other contracts. Second, we
identify the mechanism used by contracts to risk-select enrollees: varying premiums
across counties to attract more enrollments from healthy individuals. We refer back to
Table 2 when we analyze the selection response by insurers. Third, we turn to explaining
why QBP incentivized contracts to select healthier enrollees. We show that health outcome
measures in the quality rating fail to adjust for pre-existing health conditions at the time
of enrollment, making healthier enrollees more profitable to insurers with quality-linked
payments. We quantify the selection gains on the quality ratings and the bonus payments
using an instrumental variable strategy. We discuss the distributional implications of
14Benchmark bonuses to 5-star contracts in these counties exceed the standard 5%. The additional
bonus is applied to all contracts in the county. Double bonus counties tend to be urban counties with low
fee-for-service spending and high Medicare Advantage penetration rates.
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selection on health inequality and healthcare access, and suggest ways to combat the
adverse effects through improved design of the quality rating.
4 QBP and Risk Selection
The Quality Bonus Payment demonstration introduced more generous payments to in-
surers with higher quality ratings. In this section we exploit the payment differential
by quality to empirically examine how insurers responded to the policy with respect to
changes to their risk pools and pricing strategies.
We formalize our analysis using a standard difference-in-difference framework. We
distinguish two groups of contracts, high- and low-quality, and two periods, before and
after 2011. The difference over the time horizon captures the base rate cut which affects all
contracts regardless of quality. The second difference captures the greater bonus payments
to high-quality contracts in the post-reform period. Despite QBP became effective only
from 2012, the payment incentives can already affect insurer pricing in 2011. Because the
payment model was signed into law as part of the ACA in March, 2010, insurers had until
June, 2010 to finalize the bid and benefit design for enrollment year 2011. We hence allow
for anticipatory effects in the first post-reform year (2011) in our analysis.
We define high- and low-quality contracts using star ratings in the 2009-2010 baseline.
Since bonus payments were initially restricted to contracts rated 4.0 stars and above in the
ACA model, extended to contracts below 4.0 stars by the QBP demonstration, we use the
4.0 star cut-off to define contract quality. We refer to contracts rated 4.0 stars and above in
2009 and 2010 as high-quality contracts, and those rated below 4.0 stars but no less than
3.0 stars in 2009-2010 as low-quality contracts. Lower-rated contracts below 3.0 stars are
subject to suspension if the star rating does not improve in two years. We do not include
these contracts in the low-quality group.
Table 2 summarizes the estimation sample. We aggregate plan-level characteristics to
the contract level using plan enrollment weights, and show separate statistics for high-
and low-quality contracts in our sample. Panel A looks at contract-year observations used
in the difference-in-differences analysis. High-quality contracts tend to serve lower-risk
counties, bid closer to the benchmark, and provide smaller rebates to enrollees. They also
charge higher premiums and are less likely to offer zero-premium plans. Differences in
the drug deductibles are not statistically significant.
We estimate the following contract-level difference-in-differences model,
yct = β · highc · postt +αc + τt + ct, (2)
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where the main outcome of interest yct is the risk score of contract c in year t, and high
and post are indicator variables for high-quality contracts (rated 4.0 stars or above in 2009-
2010) and the post-QBP years (2011 and after), respectively. In our preferred specification,
we include contract fixed effects αc to control for unobserved heterogeneity across contracts.
To the extent that time-varying quality rating can affect the contract’s selection and pricing
strategy, we also control for contemporaneous star rating in the robustness analysis. This
has little effects on the point estimates.
Although we specify baseline high-quality contracts as the treated group, the differen-
tial effect could be driven by either the low- or high-quality contracts. The specification
itself does not imply that high-quality contracts are the drivers behind the estimated
effects. To empirically investigate which contracts responded to the reform and how, in
subsequent analyses we extend the basic specification to examine selection mechanism
across geographic locations. The results make clear that the effect on risk score, our main
outcome variable, is not driven by the low-quality controls. Equation 2 therefore serves as
the natural starting point of our analysis.
4.1 Risk Scores Improved More for High-Quality Contracts
We first estimate equation 2 where the dependent variable is a contract’s risk score. Table 3
shows the results. As an insurance contract is composed of multiple plans, we obtain
the contract risk scores by aggregating the plan risk scores to the contract level using
enrollment weights in column 1-2, and using equal weights in column 3-4. We also use
the plan risk scores as the outcome variable in column 5-6. The odd-numbered columns
control for contract or plan fixed effects. Across specifications, risk score decreased
significantly in high-quality contracts. The preferred specification in column 1 shows a
2.6 percentage point decrease in the high-quality risk score, with larger effects above 4
percentage points in the cross section.15
Figure 1 shows the raw trends and the event study. Before the payment demonstration
became law in 2010, risk scores in both quality stayed on parallel trends. In 2011,
high-quality risk scores decreased below the low-quality counterparts, and remained
so throughout the demonstration period. In the event study, risk scores decreased more in
high-quality contracts after 2011, and the difference grew larger in 2012-2014.
15In fixed-effect models, contemporaneous star ratings have no effect on risk scores (Appendix Table A1).
This is because high-quality contracts remain higher rated after the QBP (column 1-2), and the change in
risk score is not driven by temporal shocks to quality. The result is also not driven by a handful of 5-star
contracts accepting enrollees year round since 2012 (Decarolis and Guglielmo, 2017). Dropping 5-star
contract-years has little effects on the estimates (Appendix Table A2).
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The effect on risk scores is driven by high-quality plans. To see this, Figure 2 plots the
kernel density of risk scores in high- and low-quality contracts, before (2009-2010) and
after the QBP (2011-2014).16 Risk scores decreased in high-quality contracts particularly
in the lower deciles of the distribution. The density shift in low-quality contracts is
negligible. Figure 3 confirms this result by plotting the distributional effects on deciles of
risk scores, showing quantile difference-in-differences estimates in panel (a) and change-
in-changes estimates (Athey and Imbens, 2006) in panel (b). Both sets of estimates suggest
that the decrease in high-quality risk scores is concentrated in the 20%-40% deciles,
where risk scores decreased by 4-8 percentage points, or 4%-9% below the baseline levels
(Appendix Table A3).
Heterogeneous Effects. We also examine the heterogeneous effects by contracts with
different exposure to risk types in the service area. Since Medicare beneficiaries who did
not purchase private plans remain in the fee-for-service (FFS) program, MA contracts
in counties with lower FFS risk scores are exposed to lower-risk enrollees. To explore
the implications for the risk composition change in high-quality contracts, we construct
service area risk at the contract level by averaging baseline FFS risk scores across the
contract’s service area.
Table 4 estimates the effects on the risk scores of high-quality contracts divided by
service area risks. We find larger effects on high-quality contracts below the median service
area risk (0.975), where risk scores decreased by 3.7 percentage points (column 1). The
effect is small and insignificant above the median risk (column 2). In column 3-4, risk
scores fell by 4.3 percentage points for high-quality contracts in the lower 25% of service
area risk, but only slightly in the upper 25%. Figure 4 illustrates the results. Risk scores
trended similarly between low-quality contracts and high-quality contracts serving riskier
counties, but fell sharply in high-quality contracts serving lower-risk counties.17
The overall decrease in high-quality risk scores is therefore concentrated in what we
call the high-selection contracts – high-quality contracts with below-median service area
risks in the baseline. This heterogeneous effect suggests that exposure to low-risk enrollees
in the service area potentially contributes to the risk composition gain at the contract
level. The next subsection explores differential entry to low-risk counties as a potential
mechanism of selection.
16We show yearly density plot in Appendix Figure B1, and yearly plan risk score distribution in Appendix
Figure B2.
17The heterogeneous response by service area risk also applies to a smaller set of high-quality contracts
rated 4.5 stars and above in the baseline (Appendix Table A4).
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4.2 Market Characteristics do not Explain Risk Selection
One mechanism of the effect on risk scores is adjustments in the service areas of high-
quality contracts. It is possible that high-quality contracts selectively entered counties
with favorable characteristics, and the makeup of service areas affected the risk types
enrolled in the contract. In this case, we expect contract-level market characteristics to
partially explain the risk score differences between high- and low-quality contracts.
To detect adjustments in the service area, we replace yearly county characteristics with
values in 2012, and average across the service area to generate contract-year observations
of market characteristics. The resulting variable captures changes in the composition
of a service area along measured characteristics, not the temporal variation in these
characteristics. For instance, a decrease in the service area FFS risk score would indicate
increased entry in low-risk counties or exits from high-risk counties, depending on the
change in the market size.
Table 5 shows little change in the market characteristics. Basic compositions such as
the number of counties and plans in the service area remained stable between high- and
low-quality contracts. Important for the effect on risk scores, service area risk scores did
not decrease in high-quality contracts after the payment reform (column 2). Although
risk scores decreased more in contracts serving low-risk counties, differential entry into
low-risk counties does not explain the risk composition gain of high-quality contracts.
Since the QBP demonstration also varied county benchmarks and awarded additional
benchmark bonuses in the double bonus counties, we also check if contracts differentially
selected into high-benchmark counties (column 3) or double-bonus counties (column 4).18
We see no evidence of differential selection by high-quality contracts along these margins.
4.3 Pricing After QBP: Bids, Rebates, Premiums and Deductibles
We next investigate whether price differences between high- and low-quality contracts
can explain the decrease in high-quality risk scores. On one hand, bonuses on rebate
percentages tend to put downward pressure on the premiums of high-quality contracts.
On the other hand, the benchmark bonuses allow high-quality contracts to place higher
bids without affecting the rebate to enrollees (see equation 1). The ultimate pass-through
of bonus payments to prices can affect the risk pool of high-quality contracts.
We analyze these aspects of the pricing response in Table 6, examining benchmarks,
18We define double bonus counties as having a 60% top-off above the standard bonus rate on benchmarks:
5-star contracts receive at least a 8% bonus in these counties, or 60% above the standard 5% bonus.
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bids or rebates as the dependent variable in equation 2.19 In column 1, benchmarks in-
creased mechanically due to the benchmark bonuses to high-quality contracts.20 Column 2
shows that high-quality contracts increased the bids by more than the benchmark bonuses,
resulting in a narrowing of the benchmark-bid gap by $9.17 in column 3. Adjusting the
gap by the bonus on rebate percentages, rebate dollars to enrollees increased by $0.40 in
high-quality contracts, an effect indistinguishable from zero.
Appendix Figure B3 shows the raw trends. Bids and benchmarks followed parallel
pre-trends but increased more in high-quality contracts after the payment reform. The
bid-benchmark gap remained roughly constant between high and low quality throughout
the sample period, and rebate increased only slightly in high-quality contracts. These
results suggest that the bonus payments to high-quality contracts are largely retained as
insurer revenues, with near-zero pass-through to enrollees in the form of rebates.
Table 7 estimates the effects of QBP on the premiums and drug deductibles charged by
high-quality contracts using equation 2. We do not find meaningful premium differences
between high- and low-quality contracts in either Part C or Part D (column 1-2). Appendix
Figure B4 shows the raw trends. Evidence for significant differences in drug deductibles
is also not strong. Column 3 estimates a marginally significant decrease in the drug
deductibles of high-quality contracts. Relevant for 84% of MA-PD plans (cf Table 2), the
share of zero-deductible plans did not differ by quality (column 4). Moreover, overall
coverage generosity as measured by the rebate remained similar between high- and low-
quality contracts.
The null effect on the price differences at the contract level is at odds with the significant
effect on the risk scores of high-quality contracts. Since plan generosity and prices did
not vary differentially by quality, risk scores tend to follow parallel trends. Yet, risk scores
decreased in high-quality contracts. Within the same contract, however, premiums can
differ across counties with different exposure to risk types, and the margin of response is
not captured by the analysis so far. We examine this margin of response next.
5 Varying Prices Across Counties to Risk Select Enrollees
The previous section suggests that the effect on risk score is not explained by the contract-
level differences in prices or service area characteristics. Within contracts, however, there
is large variation across service areas overlooked in the contract-level analysis. Panel B
19To avoid the confounding effect due to changes in the risk score, the payment variables are risk-
neutralized to reflect the cost of insuring an average Medicare enrollee of risk score 1.
20The effect is mechanic since we do not observe a similar increase in the raw benchmarks of high-quality
contracts (point estimate $0.52, p-value 0.85), or an increase in the service area benchmarks in Table 5.
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of Table 2 summarizes the variation. High-quality contracts offer a greater number of
plans in a given county, charge higher premiums for both the Part C and Part D coverage,
and have slightly larger market shares among rated contracts. Difference in the drug
deductibles remain statistically insignificant.
This section investigates the risk composition change from within the contract’s service
area, comparing prices charged by the same contract across counties with different FFS
risk scores. Specifically, we estimate the following tripe-difference design
yclt = β0 · riskcl ·highc ·postt +β1 · riskcl ·postt +β2 ·highc ·postt +β ·Xlt +αcl + τt + clt. (3)
The variables high and post identify the high-quality group and the post QBP period as
in Section 4. The outcome variables are prices varying at the level of contract c, year t,
and location l. Locations refer to the counties in a contract’s service area. A contract can
offer different plans covering different counties. In each county, we generate contract-level
prices from plan premiums and deductibles weighted by enrollments. Variable riskcl
measures the risk score differences across counties in a contract’s service area. Specifically,
we calculate county l’s distance to the median county risk score in the service area of
contract c, and use the distance-to-median measure in riskcl as the key independent
variable in the analysis.21 By construction, riskcl varies across locations within contracts,
and varies across contracts given location.
We include contract-county fixed effects αcl to absorb the baseline differences in prices
across contracts and counties, as well as contract-specific unobserved heterogeneity across
counties. We control for year fixed effects in τt. Assuming that price differences over
county risk scores would have remained similar absent the reform, β1 gives the effect of
bonus payments on the price variation in low-quality contracts. Further assuming that the
price variation over risk scores is parallel between high and low quality absent the reform,
β0 gives the effect of larger payments on the price variation in high-quality contracts.
In Xlt, we control for time-varying, location-specific payment incentives that may
affect prices in these locations. Specifically, we include yearly raw benchmarks, bonus
rates, and bonus-adjusted benchmarks in Xlt.22 Other time-varying factors at the contract-
location level are harder to control for but can invalidate the design even with parallel pre-
trends. For example, if high-quality contracts differentially entered high-bonus counties or
21To construct the measure, we take the full set of counties covered by a contract, rank them by the
baseline FFS risk scores in 2009-2010, derive the median county risk in each contract, and construct the
distance-to-median measure for each county in the service area. Section 5.5 shows robustness of key results
to alternative measures of risk differences within contracts.
22We use the maximum bonus applied to 5-star contracts to measure the benchmark generosity in a county.
The maximum bonuses are higher in the double bonus counties.
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exited high-risk counties, then selected service area characteristics would result in biased
estimates of the price variation. However, Section 4.2 finds little evidence of selection over
service area risk or benchmark, mitigating this endogeneity concern.
To illustrate the identifying variation, we show difference-in-differences estimates sep-
arately for high- and low-quality contracts, before showing the triple-difference estimates
on high quality. In each case, we assess the validity of the identifying assumption based
on raw trends and event study estimates. The assumption in the difference-in-differences
setting requires that the within-contract price variation over county risk scores remains
similar in pre-reform years. In the triple-difference setting, it further requires that the
differential variation by quality remains similar in pre-reform years.
5.1 Varying Premiums to Risk Select Enrollees
We estimate the premium response of insurers by first investigating Part C premiums, and
then Part D premiums. Table 8 shows the differences in Part C premiums in low- and
high-quality contracts (column 1-2), and the differential effect on high-quality contracts
(column 3).23 We do not find significant differences over county risk scores in either
quality. Column 4-6 restrict the within-contract locations to the lower and upper 15% of
county risks in the contract’s service area. Although selection in these counties has greater
impacts on the overall risk score, variation in the Part C premium is similar in the risk
tails and remains statistically insignificant.24
Premiums varied significantly over county risk scores in Part D. Across the 15% risk
tails, Table 9 estimates that Part D premiums were $1.70 higher in high-quality contracts
for every ten percentage point increase in the county risk score (column 6), or 7% above
the mean. The differential effect is driven primarily by the high-quality contracts (column
5), whereas the variation in low-quality contracts is small and insignificant (column 4).
We find similar patterns across the full service area in column 1-3, where the variation is
weaker in high-quality contracts and remains insignificant in low-quality contracts.25
Figure 5 displays the effects on Part D premiums. The event study shows similar
premium variation over county risk scores between 2009 and 2010 in each quality, and
similar differential by quality in 2009-2010. After the reform, Part D premiums increased
23Based on the variation in riskcl , we cluster standard errors two-way at the level of counties and contracts.
24Appendix Figure B5 plots the event study and the raw trends. Although premiums stayed on parallel
trends in 2009-2010, there is no significant change in premiums across county risks after the payment
reform.
25The effect on high-quality contracts is concentrated in those rated 4.0-4.5 stars in the baseline (Appendix
Table A5). Only a small number of high-quality contracts ever obtained 5-star ratings, and the premium
variation within these contracts is somewhat weaker.
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by as much as $2.40 per ten percentage point increase in the county risk score ($2.48 across
15% tails) in high-quality contracts. The variation in low-quality contracts remained
insignificant throughout the sample period. On the raw trend, instead of showcasing the
premium variation over risk score itself, we split the service area of each contract into
high- and low-risk counties – grouping either by the median or across 15% tails – and plot
the price variation over binary groups of county risks for an average high- and low-quality
contract.26 We find larger increases in premiums in the upper 15% of county risk scores –
especially in 2011 and 2012 – relative to the parallel price levels in low-quality contracts
over the same period. Premium differences were similar in pre-reform years both within
and between quality.
Since a fair amount of Medicare Advantage contracts are priced at zero premiums (cf
Table 2), we also examine the offer of zero-premium plans across service areas as one
particular margin of response by insurers. Consistent with the variation in the price levels,
high-quality contracts significantly increased the offer of zero-premium plans in low-risk
counties (Appendix Table A6), and an increasing share of enrollment in zero-premium
plans came from low-risk counties (Appendix Table A7). In both cases the effects are
concentrated in the Part D premiums. Appendix Figure B6 shows the raw trends and the
event study.
Combining Part C and Part D premiums, total premiums increased by $3.56 more
in high-quality contracts per ten percentage point risk score in the risk tails (Appendix
Table A8). Effect sizes are comparable over the QBP demonstration period (Appendix
Figure B7). The premium differences favoring enrollees in low-risk counties potentially
contribute to the risk composition gain in high-quality contracts. We examine this mecha-
nism in detail in Section 5.3. We next look at drug deductibles.
5.2 Varying Drug Deductibles to Risk Select Enrollees
The pricing of drug deductibles did not vary substantially across service areas or con-
tract quality. Appendix Table A9 shows the results of estimating equation 3 using drug
deductible as dependent variable. The estimates show that both quality increased drug
deductibles by approximately $3 per ten percentage point risk score. However, raw trends
and the event study reveal a significant pre-reform effect in 2009 in high-quality contracts
(Appendix Figure B8). Since 2010, event study estimates indicate rising drug deductibles
with county risk scores in high-quality contracts. Due to the noise in the data, we do not
pursue the variation in drug deductibles as a potential mechanism of the risk composition
26Because of this, the variation picked up in the event study graph appears more muted on the raw trend.
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gain in high quality, and mostly focus on the variation in premiums. This is justified also
by the fact that, as we discuss briefly in Section 5.4, differences in premiums account for
around 70%-80% of the differences in the overall generosity by quality.
5.3 Mechanism
While the premium variation is consistent with the selection of healthier individuals in
low-risk counties, similar variation could also emerge from premium responses to other
county characteristics correlated with risk scores. For instance, if high-quality contracts
targeted high-income markets where risk scores tend to be lower, then the premium
variation may be driven by selection over non-risk demand factors rather than risk types.
Here we consider a range of demand and supply factors that can plausibly generate the
premium variation through the correlation with risk.27
Socio-Economic Factors. Appendix Table A10 estimates the premium variation by county
differences in per capita income and transfer income. We do not find significant premium
variation with either measure of income. Specifically, premiums did not increase in high-
transfer counties or decrease in high-income counties, contrary to the risk composition
gain in high-quality contracts. Appendix Table A11 finds similar null effects by county
demographics such as racial composition and college education.
Market Competition. Appendix Table A12 explores market competition as an alterna-
tive driver of the premium variation. Premiums increased with market concentration in
high-quality contracts (column 2).28 However, risk scores tend to be lower in more concen-
trated markets, implying lower premiums in riskier counties due to market competition.
Moreover, controlling for the effect of competition increased the premium variation over
risk scores (column 5). The evidence indicates that the premium variation is not driven by
the competitive effects on prices, but is constrained by such effects in more competitive
markets.
Provider Quality. We next consider differences in provider costs and quality as alternative
drivers of the premium variation over risk scores. If high-risk counties are associated
with lower quality and higher costs, then payments to improve outcomes in these counties
can crowd out rebates to enrollees, generating the premium variation over risk scores.
To investigate the quality channel, we use hospital readmission rates and preventable
27Details of the county characteristics examined here are provided in Appendix C.2.
28Specifically, greater concentration at the county level increases premiums in high-quality contracts, but
concentration within quality markets has no significant impacts on premiums (column 7-9).
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hospital stays as measures of inpatient and outpatient quality. We do not detect meaningful
variation over either quality in Appendix Table A13.
Provider Cost. We investigate the cost channel exploiting adjustments on fee-for-service
(FFS) costs in Appendix Table A14. Premiums did not vary over costs in either quality. In
high-selection contracts where risk scores decreased more (column 3), premiums increased
with FFS costs. Similar patterns hold when we adjust for the price levels in costs in column
5-8.29 Adjusting price-standardized costs by risk scores in column 9-12 cuts the effect size
on high-selection contracts by half and renders the variation insignificant.30 These results
imply that premiums did not vary with local price levels or the practice of care, but varied
with costs through the composition of risks across space.
Coding Intensity. Finally, since counties with more intensive coding of diagnoses have
higher risk scores for similar health conditions, premiums could instead respond to the
coding intensity in the fee-for-service risk scores. To remove cross-space differences in
the coding of risk scores given health, Appendix Table A16 adjusts risk scores with the
diagnosis intensity factors developed in Finkelstein et al. (2017).31 Upon adjustment, we
find stronger variation of Part D premiums over risk scores relative to the main results
in Table 9. The effects on Part C premiums and drug deductibles remain insignificant.
Therefore premiums responded directly to the health of enrollees rather than location-
specific non-health factors coded in the risk score.
Although it is impossible to consider all correlates of risk, we can rule out common de-
mand and supply factors as drivers of the premium variation over county risks. Moreover,
exploiting adjustments on costs and risk scores, we show that premium responded directly
to the health of enrollees in the county, but not to local price levels, practice style, or other
non-health factors coded in the risk score. We further analyze the economic incentives
driving the premium variation over health in Section 6, where we examine the design
details of the quality rating to understand the pricing response by insurers.
29The adjustment uses national input prices to calculate labor and facility costs, and override local
reimbursement rates with a fixed national schedule.
30Appendix Table A15 shows similar effects across binary groups of high- and low-cost counties. In these
specifications the scale of the cost variable has no direct impact on the effect sizes. Premium differences over
costs are greatly reduced once we take out the risk component in costs.
31These adjustors are generated from movers in the elderly FFS population who have similar underlying
health conditions but different risk scores due to location-specific coding intensity. By construction, the
adjustors remove cross-space differences in risk scores for a given level of underlying heath conditions.
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5.4 Insurance Generosity
Although we mainly focus on premiums, other price and non-price designs of the insurance
contract may also vary in favor of healthier individuals. Instead of analyzing every detail
of the insurance contract in relation to the risk composition change in high quality, we use
rebate as a measure of overall insurance generosity and seek to understand the extent of
generosity differences that can be explained by differences in premiums.32
We estimate equation 3 using rebates as the dependent variable in column 4 of Ap-
pendix Table A17. The estimate suggests that rebates increased by $4.44 less in high-
quality contracts for every ten percentage point increase in the county risk score. Of the
$4.44 loss of rebates, $3.56 was added onto premiums in high-quality contracts (Appendix
Table A8). Put together, premium differences account for 80% of the differences in the
overall generosity by quality.
In high-selection contracts, the loss of rebates relative to low-quality contracts was
$7.17 for every ten percentage point risk score (column 5, Appendix Table A17), whereas
premiums increased by $5.07 above low-quality contracts (column 6, Appendix Table A18).
Based on these estimates, about 70% of the rebate differences between low-quality and
high-selection contracts are attributable to premiums. We therefore do not expect gen-
erosity differences to be a major channel of selection once we control for the differences in
premiums.
5.5 Sensitivity Analysis
Alternative Weights. In the main analysis, we weight plan-level premiums and de-
ductibles by enrollment to generate contract-level price variables. Plans and prices with
larger enrollments are weighted more at the contract level. Alternatively, taking simple
averages across plans, Appendix Table A19 to A21 find similar variation of premiums
and drug deductibles in the service area. Appendix Figure B9 to B11 show the raw trends
and event study estimates. Moreover, to limit the effect of abnormally large prices on the
estimated variation, we use the median plan price as the contract price, and find similar
variation as in the main analysis (Appendix Table A22). Appendix Figure B12 shows the
raw trends and event study of median prices.
Alternative Risk Measures. The results are robust to alternative measures of risk score
32Unlike premiums, rebates vary at the level of plans but not locations. Plans then distribute the rebates
to lower prices across locations in the service area. Assuming that the quality differential in the distribution
of rebates across counties is similar to the quality differential in the premium variation across counties, we
compare the triple-difference estimates to inform the extent of rebate differences explained by premiums.
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differences within contracts. The main analysis uses the distance-to-median measure.
Using the distance-to-mean measure, Appendix Table A23 to A25 find similar variation in
premiums and drug deductibles. Appendix Figure B13 plots the event study estimates for
this set of estimates. In the risk tails, instead of looking at the lower and upper percentiles
of county risk scores, Appendix Table A26 looks at counties more than one standard
deviation away from the mean county risk score. The effects are comparable to those in
the main analysis across the 15% tails.
6 Why Does QBP Induce Risk Selection?
So far we have shown that high-quality contracts have significantly improved their risk
pool since the QBP demonstration. The composition change is not driven by differences
in the average price levels between quality but rather by premium differences within
contracts across service areas. However, we have been silent on why risk selection is
incentivized in the first place: what are the specific aspects of the payment model which
made low-risk individuals more profitable to high-quality insurers?
This section suggests that the selection incentive may lie with the design of the quality
rating itself, activated by the financial returns to quality introduced in the payment
demonstration. Specifically, when differences in patient health conditions are not fully
adjusted for in the quality measures, healthier individuals are associated with higher
quality ratings and bonus payments to insurers. We illustrate the selection incentive in
a stylized model in Section 6.1, characterize it empirically using between- and within-
contract variation in Section 6.2 and 6.3, and examine the pricing responses in Section 6.4.
6.1 A Model of Quality Rating, Risk and Insurer Profit
To illustrate how the risk-quality linkage can affect premiums across locations, we build a
simple two-county model where the insurer can use premium differences to select healthier
enrollees and obtain higher quality ratings and payments. The insurer’s revenue depends
on the premiums in the two counties (p1 and p2), and on the benchmark B, which increases
with the quality rating q.
The demand for the contract in county l is given by sl = sl(p), and the average risk
score of contract enrollees is given by r(p1,p2). Due to the measurement bias, rating q can
depend on the risk score r. This allows the insurer to affect the quality rating by changing
its risk pool across markets.33 We assume perfect risk adjustments on benchmarks and
33We follow Curto et al. (2014), and model pl as the extra revenue covering the difference between the
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bids, so that the insurer faces a constant marginal cost (c). In this world, risk selection
would have no bearing on the insurer profits absent the linkage with quality and quality
payments.
The insurer’s problem is to maximizes total profits
∑2
l=1(pl +B− c) · sl by choosing p1
and p2. From the first order conditions, the optimal premium in county l solves













where the εl is the semi-elasticity of demand to premium in county l.
Absent the risk-quality linkage, optimal premium equals marginal cost plus a mark-up
which is inverse to demand semi-elasticity. When the average risk score affects the quality
rating (d qd r , 0), it distorts prices through
∂r
∂pl
. Therefore, the insurer will set different
premiums across the two counties if p1 and p2 affect the average risk score differently.
Specifically, if higher risk score is associated with lower quality rating (d qd r < 0), premium
will be lower in county one relative to county two if, other things equal, county one is
more conducive to risk selection (i.e., ∂r∂p1 >
∂r
∂p2
). To see this, because dBd q · d qd r < 0 when
d q
d r < 0, premiums respond negatively to
∂r
∂pl
, or decrease in counties more conducive to
risk selection.
Hence, the observed premium variation is consistent with the selection of healthier
individuals if lower enrollee risk scores contribute to higher quality ratings. Under this
configuration, we expect premiums to decrease in counties with healthier enrollees, relative
to the baseline period where payment did not depend on the quality rating. This effect
should be stronger for contracts with greater gains from selection on the quality rating
(dBd q · d qd r ). We next examine the risk-quality mechanism in detail, signing d qd r empirically.
6.2 Selection on Health Outcome Measures
Under the lenses of the model, the Quality Bonus Payment demonstration could incentivize
selection if some measures in the quality rating are sensitive to the risk scores of enrollees.
In this case, selection would be financially incentivized by the greater returns to quality
after QBP. In this section, we first indicate that ratings on the health outcome measures
tend to favor contracts with lower enrollee risk scores. The relationship is primarily driven
by the outcomes measures for chronic conditions such as diabetes, which do not account
for the health status of enrollees at the time of enrollment. We then confirm that this link
allows high-quality contracts with low-risk enrollees to achieve greater improvements in
insurer’s bid and the benchmark.
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their outcome ratings.
Risk Scores and the Outcome Rating. As mentioned in Section 2, starting in 2012, the
overall rating is a weighted average of measure ratings applying 3.0 weights to the outcome
measures, 1.5 weights to the access measures, and 1.0 weights to the process measures.
All measures received 1.0 weights prior to 2012. As a result, the contribution of outcome
measures to the overall rating increased significantly after QBP (Appendix Table A27).
To detect the effect of risk scores on the outcome rating, we exploit the introduction of
QBP and the cross-contract variation over baseline risk scores (denoted by Risk) in a
difference-in-differences analysis analogous to equation 2.
We report the estimates in Table 10. The table considers only outcome measures that
were consistently included in the quality rating from 2009 to 2014 (“health improved”
and “diabetes and blood pressure”).34 On average, a 10 percentage point increase in
the baseline risk score is associated with a 12.2 percentage point decrease in subsequent
outcome ratings (column 1). Grouped by the source of outcome measures, self-reported
health improvement measures from the Health Outcome Survey (HOS) are minimally
correlated with risk scores (column 2). By contrast, measures of diabetes and blood
pressure management, drawn from the Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information
Set (HEDIS), are significantly and negatively correlated with risk scores (column 3). The
overall correlation between risk scores and outcome ratings is therefore completely driven
by the HEDIS measures.35
A closer inspection of the HEDIS measures suggests that a lack of risk adjustment on
these measures potentially contributes to the negative correlation with risk scores. All
three measures – Diabetes Care: Blood Sugar Controlled, Diabetes Care: Cholesterol Controlled,
and Controlling Blood Pressure – consider chronic conditions controlled if results from
medical testings are below certain thresholds, and rank contracts based on the percent of
patients showing successful control of these conditions. Blood sugar controlled, for instance,
is measured by the percent of diabetes patients with a recent blood sugar (A1c) testing
below 9%.36 However, the patient pool in the denominator is a simple sum of diabetic and
34Outcome measures later introduced to the quality rating include hospital re-admission measures (first
appearing in 2012), drug adherence measures (2012), and quality improvement measures (2014). The
difference-in-differences approach is more suitable for measures that were present in the quality rating
throughout the sample period.
35Appendix Figure B15 plots the raw trends and event study estimates.
36Similarly, Cholesterol Controlled is measured by the percent of diabetic enrollees with a re-
cent LDL-C testing below 100 mg/dL. Controlling Blood Pressure is measured by the percent of
hypertension enrollees who lowered blood pressure below 140/90 during enrollment. Details
of the outcome measures are available in the yearly Technical Note. The 2013 Note is acces-
sible at https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Prescription-Drug-Coverage/PrescriptionDrugCovGenIn/
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hypertensive enrollees, and the medical thresholds in the numerator are uniformly applied
to all patients without adjusting for the severity of conditions. The lack of risk adjustment
implies that outcome ratings would be negatively correlated with risk scores, if lower-risk
enrollees are more likely to pass the medical thresholds and boost the outcome ratings
of insurers.37 In this case, contracts that selected healthier enrollees after the payment
reform should also experience greater improvements in the outcome rating. We examine
this relationship below.
Linking Selection and Contract Quality. We connect the change in the outcome rating
to the risk-selection behavior of high-quality contracts that emerged in Section 4 and 5.
In particular, we test whether high-quality contracts with riskier enrollees experienced
smaller increase in the outcome ratings, and whether high-selection contracts with greater
improvements in the risk pool also improved more in the outcome ratings.
Appendix Table A28 reports difference-in-differences estimates from the specification
in equation 2, where we compare the rating dynamics across high-quality contracts with
different baseline enrollee risk scores. Contracts that started out with riskier enrollees
had lower outcome ratings in subsequent years. The loss of outcome ratings was larger in
higher-rated contracts (4.5 stars) and higher percentiles (top 25%) of risk scores, driven
completely by lower ratings on the chronic condition measures from HEDIS. Appendix
Figure B16 plots the raw trends. Ratings on access and process measures did not differ
across baseline enrollee risk scores (Appendix Table A29).
Using a similar approach, we show that lower service area risk scores mitigate the loss
of outcome ratings in higher-rated contracts (4.5 stars). Contracts serving lower-risk areas
saw smaller decrease in the outcome rating (Appendix Table A30). In the lower 25% of
service area risks, the loss of HEDIS rating is only marginally larger than in low-quality
contracts, implying significant relative gains over high-quality contracts in riskier counties.
Figure 6 plots the raw trends. Contracts in the lowest-risk counties also decreased risk
scores more than other high-quality contracts (Appendix Table A4), and risk selection was
not associated with significant gains in the access and process ratings of these contracts
Downloads/2013-Part-C-and-D-Preview-2-Technical-Notes-v090612-.pdf
37The health literature has raised similar concerns over the lack of risk adjustments on the HEDIS quality
measures (e.g., Zhang et al., 2000, Safford et al., 2009). In the case of blood sugar control, for instance,
Zhang et al. (2000) and Safford et al. (2009) show that adjusting for diabetes severity and co-morbidities
meaningfully altered the quality ranking and outlier status of facilities in the Veteran Health Administration.
Specific to the Medicare Advantage star ratings, Nichols et al. (2018) shows that patients with multiple
co-morbidities are associated with worse medication adherence and blood sugar control.
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(Appendix Table A31).
Next, we provide additional evidence on the link between risk scores and outcome
ratings in two ways. First, we confirm that the outcome ratings responded to risk scores by
exploiting the fact that outcome ratings released in year t depend on measures obtained
two years prior. Second, we draw on additional data on chronic conditions to show
that contracts increased premiums in areas with higher prevalence of chronic conditions
using an approach similar to that in Section 5. Ultimately, these findings support the
construction of the instruments that we will use to quantify selection in Section 6.5.
6.3 Quality and Risk Scores Over Time
This section examines the within-contract correlation between outcome ratings and risk
scores over time. We exploit the 2-year delay between the measurement of chronic
conditions in HEDIS and their entry in the quality rating to construct contemporaneous
risk-outcome correlations, and compare them with correlations across other lag or lead
periods for the same contract. If riskier individuals have worse measured outcomes, then a
negative correlation should occur between outcome ratings and risk scores 2 years prior.
Figure 7 plots the correlation coefficients between HEDIS outcome ratings in year t
and risk scores in year t − 3, t − 2, t − 1 and t. We restrict the correlation to within-contract
variation in ratings and risk scores over time, and group the coefficients by baseline quality.
The contemporaneous pattern in panel (b) shows an average correlation coefficient of
-0.5 (-0.6 median) for contracts with at least a 4.5 star in the baseline, where 75% have a
negative coefficient over the sample period. The median correlation coefficient in high-
quality contracts is -0.36, with more skewed distribution to the negative in high-selection
contracts. We do not find similar magnitude of correlation or differentials by quality in
other lag or lead periods.38
Appendix Table A32 shows the regression estimates of outcome ratings on risk scores
across periods. Estimated effects of risk scores are large and significant in high-selection
contracts, and insignificant in the lag and lead periods. However, these estimates may be
biased due to selected risk scores in the outcome measures. We correct for the selection
and estimate the causal impact of risk scores on outcomes using an instrumental variable
approach in Section 6.5.
38Similar correlation patterns exist between risk scores and the overall star ratings in Appendix Figure B17.
Lower risk scores are associated with higher star ratings two years later, and contracts with greater decreases
in risk scores exhibit more negative within-contract correlations.
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6.4 Varying Premiums to Deter Enrollees with Chronic Conditions
This section inspects the selection response of insurers to the outcome ratings. Adopting
the framework of Section 5.1, we compare premiums across counties with different expo-
sure to chronic conditions. We report estimates based on a triple difference regression
analogous to equation 3, but instead of county risk scores in the variable risk, we focus on
chronic condition prevalence rates interacted with coding-adjusted county risk scores to
account for the health differences across counties. In this way, the raw prevalence rate is
adjusted downward in counties where patients have fewer and less severe conditions.39
We focus on diabetes in Appendix Table A33, which estimates the premium variation
over diabetes prevalence rates. Part D premiums increased by $8.85-$11.25 per ten
percentage point increase in the prevalence rate in high-selection contracts (column 6- 7).
Figure 8 plots the premium differences across high- and low-prevalence counties. Although
the raw trends suggest larger premium increases in 2011-2012 in high-prevalence counties,
effect sizes are comparable over years in the event study. We find similar effects on higher-
rated contracts (4.5 stars) in Appendix Table A34 (raw trends in Appendix Figure B18),
where larger selection effects are concentrated in high-selection contracts serving lower-
risk counties. We also find similar results for hypertension.40
To summarize, premiums varied significantly over chronic conditions in high-selection
and higher-rated contracts. Both types of contracts saw large improvements in the risk
pool and outcome ratings after the payment reform. The selection response is incentivized
by the design of outcome ratings favoring low-risk enrollees, and the correlations with
risk scores are stronger within high-selection and higher-rated contracts. Building on
these results, we develop an instrumental variable approach in the next section to causally
assess the selection incentive due to QBP.
6.5 Quantifying Risk Selection in the Health Oucome Measure
Our previous analyses suggest that the HEDIS outcome measures are subject to substantial
gaming by insurers. To causally estimate the impact of risk scores on the HEDIS outcomes,
this section develops an instrumental variable (IV) strategy that relies on the finding that
contracts varied premiums across counties to attract healthier individuals and improve
39We obtain diabetes prevalence rates by county from the Center of Disease Control (CDC), and hyperten-
sion prevalence rates from Olives et al. (2013). Appendix C provides more details on the underlying data
and the construction of prevalence rates.
40Appendix Table A35 and Figure B19 show the premium variation over hypertension prevalence rates
in higher-rated contracts. The variation is generally weaker but remains concentrated in high-selection
contracts below the median service area risk score (0.975).
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the composition of the risk pool.
We formulate the production of health outcomes as determined by a contract-specific
quality component and a component due to the risk scores of enrollees. Specifically, we
estimate the following equation
yct = αc +αc · post + β · riskct−2 + τt + it, (4)
where yct is the health outcome (as measured by HEDIS) of contract c in year t. Outcomes
are measured from enrollees two years prior, and riskct−2 denotes the concurrent risk
score of these enrollees at the contract level.41 We focus on HEDIS outcomes in 2011-2014
(corresponding to risk scores in 2009-2012) and define post = 1 for 2013-2014.
The intercept αc is a contract fixed effect. We interpret αc as the contract’s ability to
control the chronic conditions of a unit-risk enrollee: αc · post measures the value-added
in quality after the payment reform. Other than quality, outcomes may also improve due
to selected risk types in riskct−2. The selection invalidates the ordinary-least-square (OLS)
estimate of β. We employ an instrumental variable (IV) strategy to separate selection
from the value-added in quality. Since not all contracts improved outcomes by lowering
risk scores, we estimate β across sub-groups of contracts and in particular focus on high-
selection contracts with larger decreases in the risk score.
We exploit the premium variation over county risk scores to construct instruments for
riskct−2. Our empirical analyses show that premiums responded directly to the health of
enrollees. The cross-space selection of healthy individuals affected the risk composition
of contracts, which we exploit in the first-stage prediction of contract-level risk scores.
Moreover, premiums did not respond to the local supply or quality of care, or to other
demand factors potentially correlated with health (Section 5.3). For the IV research
design, it implies that the premium variation is unlikely to affect outcomes through the
composition effect on other, non-health determinants of outcomes, lending support to the
exclusivity condition. We hence construct the main instrument using correlations between
premiums and coding-adjusted county risk scores within contract-years (Finkelstein et al.,
2017), and construct similar correlations with diabetes and hypertension prevalence rates
as additional instruments for over-identification.42
Table 11 shows the OLS and two-stage-least-square (TSLS) estimates of the effects of
41The 2-year lag in the subscript distinguishes between the release and the measurement of outcomes:
outcomes released in year t are obtained from enrollees in year t − 2 (Figure 7).
42The instruments are Corr(pct−2, Rc0), where pct−2 is the vector of Part D premiums in the service area of
contract c and year t−2, and Rc0 is the vector of baseline coding-adjusted county risk scores, health-adjusted
diabetes prevalence rates and hypertension prevalence rates in the service area of contract c. We construct
the correlation coefficients within contract-years to instrument for contract-level risk scores in riskct−2.
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risk scores on the HEDIS outcomes. Recall that the HEDIS outcomes calculate the share
of diabetes or hypertension patients who have controlled their conditions below specific
medical thresholds. We look at the percentage of such enrollees as the dependent variable
in the table. Premium variation strongly predicts risk scores in high-quality contracts
serving low-risk counties (column 4-5), but not in low-quality contracts (column 1) or
high-quality contracts serving riskier counties (column 3). Correcting for selection, the
causal effect of risk scores on the outcome measures is significantly larger than the OLS
estimates. The implied gains from selection is substantial. In high-selection contracts
(column 4), lowering risk scores by 10 percentage points increased outcome measures by
10.28 percentage points. Evaluated against the risk composition gain over low-quality
contracts from 2010 to 2012 (0.025), selection increased outcome measures in high-
selection contracts by 2.57 percentage points,43 whereas the value-added per unit of risk
is a modest 0.48 percentage point. Put differently, around 85% of the outcome gains in
high-selection contracts is attributable to selection.
Appendix Table A37 estimates the effects of risk scores separately for the three HEDIS
outcomes in high-selection contracts. Selection has larger effects on controlling blood
sugar and cholesterol levels, where 57% to 85% of the outcome change is attributable to
selection. For blood pressure, the share of patients with blood pressure below 140/90
increased by 5.21 percentage points after the payment reform, and selection on risks
explains little of the improvement. Overall, the quality value-added is smaller in outcomes
based on lab tests, where other types of gaming, such as repeated measurements and
selection of the most favorable result, are less likely to affect outcomes.
In conclusion, a significant portion of the outcome gains in high-selection contracts is
due to the selection of healthier individuals. Given the effect of risk scores on outcomes, the
lack of risk adjustments on outcomes allowed high-selection contracts to receive unearned
bonus payments from Medicare. In the next section, we calculate the cost of selection to
Medicare by estimating the effect of selection on the overall star rating linked to payments.
We further discuss the broader impacts of selection on the access to high-quality insurance
across counties, and suggest ways to improve the design of the quality rating.
43Specifically, ∆Risk ·β̂T SLS = −0.025 · (−102.81) = 2.57. ∆Risk is the event study coefficient for year 2012
in the contract-level analysis of risk scores (panel b of Figure 4).
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7 Discussion
7.1 The Cost of Selection
Our findings show that the health outcome measures in the quality rating are sensitive to
the risk composition of contracts, and in response, insurers enrolled healthier individuals
using premium variation across counties. Risk selection is profitable if it raises the
overall star rating and hence the bonus payments to insurers. We regard bonus payments
rewarding selected risk types rather than value-added as overpayments, and use it as
a measure of the cost of selection to Medicare. To estimate this cost, we first estimate
the effect of selection on the overall star rating. We then calculate the savings in bonus
payments from removing the selection gains in the overall rating.
Selection and the Quality Rating. We apply the IV strategy developed in Section 6.5 to
estimate the effect of risk scores on the quality rating. Specifically, we group measures by
the weights they receive in the overall rating, and estimate the effect of selection on the star
ratings of outcome (3.0 weights), access (1.5 weights), and process (1.0 weights) measures
using equation 4. We show results for high-selection contracts in Appendix Table A38.
Risk scores have large, negative impacts on the outcome rating (column 1-2), where 71% to
77% of the star change after the payment reform is due to selection.44 The risk composition
gain over low-quality contracts from 2010 to 2012 increased outcome ratings by 0.46 star
in high-selection contracts. Adjusted by the weights of outcome measures (50% across
all measures), overall rating increased by 0.23 star in high-selection contracts on average.
Ratings on the lower-weighted access and process measures are minimally affected by risk
scores.
To construct counterfactual ratings absent the change in risk scores, we first recover the
underlying continuous star rating of each contract in 2014.45 From the continuous rating,
we subtract the selection component due to the risk score change from 2010-2012. We
estimate the risk score change for each high-selection contract using low-quality contracts
as controls.46 The adjusted rating holds the risk composition fixed at 2010, and removes
the effect of selected risk scores since 2011 on the quality rating.
44The selection effect is comparable to but different from the 85% calculated in Section 6.5 because, 1) we
look at ratings on a scale of 2 to 5 stars in this section rather than the raw statistic in each measure, and 2)
we include all measures receiving 3.0 weights in the health outcome category, whereas in Section 6.5 we
focused only on the three HEDIS measures.
45The underlying rating is a weighted average of star ratings across measures. The weighted average is
then rounded to the nearest half star as the overall star rating. More information is in Section 2.
46We obtain similar risk score changes when we construct a weighed average of low-quality contracts as
the synthetic control for each high-quality contract (Abadie et al., 2010).
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We compare the selection-adjusted rating and the original star rating in panel (a) of
Figure 9. The horizontal axis groups high-selection contracts by the original star rating in
2014. The vertical axis shows the percent of enrollees experiencing a change in the star
rating, conditional on the original rating. Adjusting for selection, around 50% of enrollees
in 4.0-star contracts and all enrollees in 3.5-star contracts would see a reduction of quality
rating to 3.0 stars. The affected contracts were marginal high-quality contracts rated below
4.0 stars on the continuous scale in 2014. 98% of enrollees in the 3.5-4.0 star range were in
marginal high-quality contracts. Even small increases in the risk score would downgrade
their contracts to 3.5 stars and below. By contrast, risk adjustment has smaller impacts on
the star rating in the 4.5-5.0 range, where 96% of enrollees were in contracts rated above
4.5 stars on the continuous scale. Adjusting for selection, all contracts in the 4.5-5.0 range
still maintain at least a 4.0 star rating.
Selection and Payments. The new star rating alters the generosity of bonus payments
to insurers (Table 1). To map the change in the star rating to the change in firm bidding
and hence program cost, we make the behavioral assumption that insurers adjust bids
to the new benchmark but keep the rebate to enrollees unchanged. This assumption is
supported by our empirical finding of a near-zero pass-through of bonus payments to
enrollees (Table 6). We therefore infer counterfactual bids by inverting equation 1 holding
rebates at the pre-adjustment level.47
We plot the difference in program costs after risk adjustment in panel (b) of Figure 9,
where costs are calculated on a monthly basis given the 2014 star rating. Selection has
larger impacts on the program cost in the 3.5-4.0 star range, where overpayment amounted
to $24 per enrollee. Both the change in the star rating and the drop in benchmark bonuses
below 4.0 stars added to the cost of selection in this group. Put differently, marginal
high-quality contracts would have lost sizeable bonus payments, if they did not improve
the quality rating above 4.0 stars and qualify for higher benchmark bonuses. In the 4.5-5.0
range, since all contracts remained above 4.0 stars where there is little bonus variation,
the cost of selection averaged $1 per enrollee in this group.48
To evaluate the size of the overpayment, we compare it with the benchmark bonus
to high-selection contracts. Relative to low-quality contracts, high-selection contracts
received $70 more in benchmarks in 2014.49 Selection raised the bonus payments to
47For insurers bidding above the benchmark, the program cost is the benchmark adjusted by the new star
rating.
48Appendix Figure B20 plots the results when the risk score change is derived from the synthetic controls.
We find similar costs of selection to most contracts and larger costs to 3.5-star contracts. The average cost of
selection in the 3.5-4.0 range remains similar ($25).
49The estimate is the event study coefficient for 2014 in the contract-level analysis of bonus-adjusted
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high-selection contracts by $9 per enrollee, or 13% of the benchmark bonus in 2014.
In marginal high-quality contracts (3.5-4.0 stars), selection increased program costs by
34% of the benchmark bonus. Put differently, for every dollar of payment that improved
quality, another $0.52 was paid to selected risk scores. Scaled by the enrollment-months
in high-selection contracts, cost of selection amounted to $51.7 million annually in 2014,
with nearly $45 million concentrated in marginal high-quality contracts. Insurers retained
these payments as profits.
In conclusion, we show that risk scores have significant effects on the quality rating
linked to payments. Without risk adjustment, healthier individuals are more profitable
to insurers, and the selection response led to sizeable costs to the program. Furthermore,
selection can have large impacts on program enrollees through the supply of high-quality
insurance across markets. We discuss the effect of selection on the spatial distribution of
quality and the welfare implications next.
7.2 Distribution of Quality Across Counties
The premium variation implies heterogeneous pass-through of bonus payments favoring
low-risk service areas. More generally, the selection response can lower the market share
of high-quality contracts in riskier counties, and shift the spatial distribution of quality
across county risk scores. We estimate the effect of the QBP demonstration on county-level
market shares of high- and low-quality contracts using the following specification
yclt = β0 · riskl · highc · postt + β1 · riskl · postt + β2 · highc · postt + β3 · highc · riskl
+ β ·Xlt +αc +γl + τt + clt,
where riskl is the baseline fee-for-service risk score in county l. yclt is the market share of
contract c in county l and year t.
The left panels of Figure 10 plot the market share changes in the lower and upper 15%
tails of county risk scores. We see clear diverging patterns by quality. At the contract level
(panel a), high-quality contracts increased market shares in the lowest-risk counties (gray
lines) and decreased market shares in the highest-risk counties (purple lines). Panel c
aggregates contract market shares by high and low quality, and shows similar differences
at the quality level. There is substantial divergence in high-quality market shares across




We present detailed evidence on the market share changes and premiums across the
15% risk tails in Appendix D. Premiums of high-quality contracts increased by $6.51
over low-quality contracts in the top 15% riskiest counties, where high-quality market
share decreased by 12.96 percentage points. In the lower risk tail, high-quality market
share grew to over 17 percentage points higher than the low-quality market share in 2014,
whereas the difference was only 2 percentage points in 2009-2010.50
The shifts in the spatial distribution of quality are the result of a supply shock on
insurer revenues. Consumer knowledge of quality ratings and preferences for quality
are not directly affected by the payment reform. Therefore, the supply-side response
to subsidies plays important roles in the regional disparities of healthcare access in the
Medicare population. To the extent that a larger share of bonus payments rewarded health
rather than quality, the supply-side response directed health spending to the healthiest
counties, and increased the transfer from taxpayers to insurers. Insurers captured the
payments by redistributing insurance benefits from risky to healthy enrollees, directly
hurting the welfare of the riskier enrollees. These distributional impacts lowered the
insurance value of the program to the riskiest population, and substantially widened the
gap in the access to high-quality insurance across regions.
7.3 Improving the Design of the Quality Rating
The selection response to quality bonus payments suggests that some form of risk adjust-
ment is necessary to inform the cross-contract comparison of outcomes. Since no official
risk-adjustment guideline exists for the HEDIS measures, we presented one approach
where an outcome production function is estimated to correct for selection using some
knowledge of the selection mechanism by firms. Alternatively, a pre-specified adjustment
formula can be applied to the outcome data directly. The ex-ante approach cannot in itself
address the coding and selection incentives created by the adjustment formula. To limit
these unintended effects on insurers, a complementary policy would down-weight the
outcome measures and re-orient the quality rating towards access and process measures
less susceptible to the selection response by insurers.
A second issue with the quality rating is that performance measures are pooled from the
contract’s service area. An average contract covers 25 counties in the service area. However,
since the design of the insurance contract and the delivery of healthcare services both
50Appendix Table A36 estimates the market share changes over the full range of county risk scores. For
every 10 percentage point increase in the risk score, market share of high-quality contracts decreased by 11.8
percentage points (column 2), or by 9 percentage points differentially over low-quality contracts (column 3).
The event studies are in the right panels of Figure 10.
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occur at the county level,51 issuing quality ratings at the contract level is uninformative of
the actual quality of care experienced by enrollees, and generates cross-space selection
incentives favoring high-quality counties and counties with greater selection gains on
quality. The within-contract premium variation is driven by both the effect of risk scores
on quality and the measurement of quality at the level of contracts rather than counties.
Finally, changes in the quality ratings are generally uninformative of the absolute qual-
ity gains or losses experienced by contracts. This is because the quality rating is a relative
ranking of contracts within the Medicare Advantage market. Apart from unadjusted
differences in risk scores and service areas, the lack of an external benchmark further
weakens the link between quality ratings and the underlying quality. To improve the
quality rating, we echo MedPAC (2010) in proposing a localized ranking of contracts at the
county level, where stars are assigned based on quality gains over similar case-mixes in
the fee-for-service program. The within-county ranking nets out location-specific factors
and limits cross-space selection in the current setting. Moreover, the ranking is directly
useful to enrollees choosing between the fee-for-service program and different quality
tiers of the private option. The new rating can be supported by more consistent keeping
and sharing of data between the fee-for-service and the private Medicare.
8 Conclusions
The Medicare Advantage (MA) market is an important setting to understand the strategic
response of private insurers to government payments. Created alongside the traditional,
fee-for-service Medicare, whether the private option delivers better care quality at lower
costs is central to the success of the MA program. Moreover, as the pay-for-performance
model proliferates in the healthcare sector, the design of market-wide quality ratings as the
basis of payments becomes increasingly important. Lessons from the MA rating provide
valuable guidance on this effort. More generally, the incentive effects inform the design
of other public-private partnerships where social insurance is contracted out to private
entities. Promoting quality while limiting the regulatory capture by private firms is the
central concern in these contexts.
Our results point to significant challenges of designing pay-for-performance contracts
in selection markets. Even small design details can have large-scale distributional impacts
when coupled with high-powered financial incentives. In the MA market, failing to risk-
adjust the quality rating for enrollee health differences resulted in systematic selection of
51Specifically, the network design of contracts must meet adequacy criteria at the county level, including
the minimum number of providers and the maximum travel time to access them for enrollees in a county.
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healthier individuals by high-quality insurers. The selection imposed significant costs on
the program, shifted the distribution of high-quality insurance towards healthier counties,
and lowered the benefit pass-through to riskier enrollees. Adjusting for selection, the
value-added in quality is modest. The unintended effects on insurers and the consequent
increase in health inequality illustrate the critical role of risk-adjustment mechanisms in
the design of quality-based payment models in insurance markets.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Quality adjustments on benchmarks and rebates
Star Rating
Year ≤2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
Benchmark Bonus αstar = 1 + %
2009/11 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
2012 0.0% 3.0% 3.5% 4.0% 4.0% 5.0%
2013 0.0% 3.0% 3.5% 4.0% 4.0% 5.0%
2014 0.0% 3.0% 3.5% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
Rebate Percentage τstar
2009/11 75.0% 75.0% 75.0% 75.0% 75.0% 75.0%
2012 66.7% 66.7% 71.7% 71.7% 73.3% 73.3%
2013 58.3% 58.3% 68.3% 68.3% 71.7% 71.7%
2014 50.0% 50.0% 65.0% 65.0% 70.0% 70.0%
Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Advance Notice of
Methodological Changes, Calendar Year 2009-2014.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII)
Full Sample Low Quality High Quality (V)-(III)
mean s.e. mean s.e. mean s.e. p-value
Panel A: Contract-Year Observations
Risk Score 0.97 0.0075 0.97 0.0093 0.96 0.012 0.55
Number of Counties 25.09 5.40 28.19 7.74 18.18 2.21 0.22
Number of Plans 3.40 0.23 3.53 0.31 3.12 0.28 0.33
Service Area Risk 0.99 0.006 1.00 0.008 0.96 0.008 0.00
Enrollment (k) 334.75 34.95 328.35 39.19 349.06 71.56 0.80
Benchmark 874.10 5.72 883.08 6.52 854.06 10.87 0.023
Bid 763.38 6.28 763.65 7.58 762.80 11.25 0.95
Benchmark-Bid 110.72 5.55 119.43 6.90 91.27 8.68 0.012
Rebate 78.37 3.73 83.55 4.68 66.80 5.74 0.025
Part C Premium 29.64 2.44 20.25 2.51 50.63 4.51 0.00
Zero Part C Premium (%) 48.74 2.81 59.27 3.29 25.23 3.90 0.00
Part D Premium 19.42 1.19 15.00 1.37 29.30 1.73 0.00
Zero Part D Premium (%) 44.23 2.87 54.98 3.42 20.23 3.68 0.00
Drug Deductible 32.62 4.42 32.85 5.72 32.11 6.40 0.93
Zero Drug Deduc (%) 84.21 1.89 84.70 2.36 83.11 3.07 0.68
N 1,122 775 347
Panel B: Contract-County-Year Observations
Enrollment (k) 18.25 2.35 17.00 2.48 21.57 4.64 0.35
Number of Plans 1.76 0.073 1.59 0.088 2.22 0.093 0.00
Part C Premium 31.96 2.65 25.17 2.74 49.94 5.47 0.00
Zero Part C Premium (%) 37.36 3.25 43.06 4.03 22.25 4.83 0.00
Part D Premium 20.74 1.43 17.77 1.73 28.60 2.17 0.00
Zero Part D Premium (%) 35.04 3.27 41.49 4.06 17.97 4.29 0.00
Drug Deductible 28.65 5.88 30.05 7.69 24.92 6.23 0.60
Zero Drug Deduc (%) 84.25 2.95 83.40 3.87 86.55 2.91 0.511
Market Share (%) 33.51 1.72 31.77 1.97 38.12 3.20 0.089
N 20,472 14,861 5,611
Notes: Table summarizes the estimation sample. Benchmark and bid variables are in dollars per risk-neutral enrollee per
month, while the other pricing variables are in dollars per enrollee per month. Enrollment is measured as enrollee-month
counts in a given year. Contracts rated at least 3.0 stars in the 2009-2010 baseline are included in our sample, summarized
in column 1-2. Baseline high- and low-quality contracts are summarized in column 3-4 and 5-6, respectively. We define
high-quality contracts as those rated 4.0 stars and above in 2009-2010, and low-quality contracts as those rated below 4.0
stars but no less than 3.0 stars in 2009-2010. Column 7 tests the null of zero differences between high- and low-quality
contracts. Plan characteristics are aggregated to the contract-year level in Panel A, and to the contract-county-year level in
Panel B, both weighted by enrollment. Details of the sample construction are in Appendix C.
38
Table 3: Effect of QBP on risk scores
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
High · Post -0.026*** -0.041*** -0.035*** -0.042*** -0.020*** -0.045***
(0.008) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.007) (0.015)
Weights plan enrollment equal weights unweighted
Fixed Effects contract contract plan
y mean 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96
R2 0.86 0.007 0.76 0.012 0.79 0.009
N 1,122 1,127 1,122 1,122 4,549 4,549
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Notes: Table shows difference-in-differences estimates on risk scores. Column 1-2 show the effects on contract
risk scores aggregated from plan risk scores weighted by enrollment. Column 3-4 show the effects on contract
risk scores as simple averages across plans. Column 5-6 show the effects on plan risk scores. We control for
contract or plan fixed effects in the odd-numbered columns, and show the cross-sectional differences in the
even-numbered columns. Standard errors clustered at the level of linked contracts (column 1-4) or plans
(column 5-6) in the parenthesis.
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Table 4: Effect on risk scores, by service area risks
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Treat · Post -0.037*** -0.016 -0.043*** -0.015
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.016)
Treat high-quality + risk high-quality + risk
< median > median < 25% > 75%
Control low-quality low-quality
y mean 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
R2 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
N 920 977 851 894
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Notes: Table shows difference-in-differences estimates on risk score, di-
viding the sample of high-quality contracts by the service area risk in the
baseline. Column 1 and 2 estimate the effect on high-quality contracts be-
low and above the median service area risk (0.975), relative to low-quality
contracts. Column 3 estimates the effect on high-quality contracts in the
lower 25% of service area risk (<0.902), and column 4 estimates the effect
on high-quality contracts in the upper 25% of service area risk (>1.007). All
specifications control for contract fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at
the level of contracts in the parenthesis.
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Table 5: Effect of QBP on market characteristics
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
# Counties Risk Benchmark Double-Bonus # Plans
County
High · Post 8.70 0.002 1.80 -0.020 -0.17
(8.39) (0.002) (2.94) (0.021) (0.23)
y mean 25.09 0.99 799.15 0.72 3.40
R2 0.73 0.98 0.96 0.90 0.87
N 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Notes: Table shows difference-in-differences estimates on the composition of service areas along measured
characteristics. We use 2012 values of county benchmarks and FFS risk scores to construct service area
characteristics in column 2-4 at the contract-year level. Numbers of counties (column 1) and plans
(column 5) are counted within contract-years. Estimated effects indicate selection over the composition of
service areas along measured characteristics rather than the temporal variation in these characteristics.
All regressions include contract fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the level of contracts in the
parenthesis.
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Table 6: Effect of QBP on benchmarks, bids, and rebates
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Benchmark Bid Benchmark-Bid Rebate
High · Post 27.84*** 37.01*** -9.17 0.39
(7.10) (7.50) (6.07) (3.68)
y mean 874.10 763.38 110.72 78.37
R2 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.87
N 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Notes: Table shows difference-in-differences estimates on benchmarks, bids and rebates.
We aggregate plan level benchmarks (inclusive of bonus adjustments), bids, and rebates
(inclusive of bonus adjustments) to the contract level using enrollment weights. All
regressions include contract fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the level of contracts
in the parenthesis.
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Table 7: Effect of QBP on premiums and drug deductibles
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Part C Part D Drug Zero
Premium Premium Deductible Deductible
High · Post 0.81 2.33 -16.98* 0.051
(2.87) (1.58) (8.98) (0.045)
y mean 29.64 19.42 32.62 0.84
R2 0.87 0.81 0.69 0.63
N 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Notes: Table shows difference-in-difference estimates on premiums and drug de-
ductibles. We aggregate plan level variables to the contract level using enrollment
weights. All regressions include contract fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the
level of contracts in the parenthesis.
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Table 8: Effect of QBP on Part C premiums, within-contract variation
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Risk · High · Post 18.08* 18.63
(10.45) (13.50)
Risk · Post -10.43 7.44 -11.33* -8.74 6.88 -10.34
(6.42) (10.25) (6.29) (6.75) (12.80) (6.48)
High · Post -3.68 -4.66
(3.79) (3.99)
Counties all 15% tails
Contracts low high all low high all
y mean 25.17 49.94 31.96 24.97 75.47 31.20
R2 0.77 0.85 0.82 0.77 0.85 0.82
N 14,861 5,611 20,472 4,393 1,641 6,034
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Notes: Table shows the within-contract variation in Part C premiums over county risk scores.
Column 1-2 show the difference-in-differences estimates on the premium variation in low-
and high-quality contracts, respectively. Column 3 shows the triple-difference estimate on the
differential variation in high-quality contracts. Column 4-6 repeat the analysis but restrict the
within-contract locations to the lower and upper 15% of county risk scores in the contract’s
service area. All regressions control for contract-county fixed effects. Standard errors clustered
two-way at the level of contracts and counties in the parenthesis.
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Table 9: Effect of QBP on Part D premiums, within-contract variation
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Risk · High · Post 12.43* 16.98**
(7.49) (7.98)
Risk · Post -4.56 13.56** -3.42 -4.75 14.76** -4.32
(4.83) (6.31) (4.71) (5.17) (6.99) (4.97)
High · Post 2.44 3.50*
(2.31) (1.90)
Counties all 15% tails
Contracts low high all low high all
y mean 17.77 28.60 20.74 17.46 27.60 20.22
R2 0.76 0.67 0.75 0.75 0.70 0.75
N 14,861 5,611 20,472 4,393 1,641 6,034
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Notes: Table shows the within-contract variation in Part D premiums over county risk scores.
Column 1-2 show the difference-in-differences estimates on the premium variation in low-
and high-quality contracts, respectively. Column 3 shows the triple-difference estimate on the
differential variation in high-quality contracts. Column 4-6 repeat the analysis but restrict the
within-contract locations to the lower and upper 15% of county risk scores in the contract’s
service area. All regressions control for contract-county fixed effects. Standard errors clustered
two-way at the level of contracts and counties in the parenthesis.
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Table 10: Effect on outcome ratings by baseline risk scores
(I) (II) (III)
Outcome Health Diabetes &
Mean Improved Blood Pressure
Risk · Post -1.22** -0.11 -1.37**
(0.48) (0.27) (0.58)
y mean 3.45 3.28 3.60
R2 0.63 0.22 0.69
N 997 888 991
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Notes: Table shows the effect of baseline enrollee risk scores on the
outcome ratings. The difference-in-differences estimates compare the
rating dynamics across contracts with different baseline risk scores.
Column 1 looks at the average rating over outcome measures. Column
2-3 group the outcome measures by the source of measurement. Mea-
sures of self-reported health improvement in column 2 come from the
Health Outcome Survey (HOS). Measures of managing diabetes and
blood pressure conditions in column 3 come from the Healthcare Ef-
fectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS). All regressions include
contract and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the level of
contracts in the parenthesis.
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Table 11: Effect of selection on the HEDIS outcome
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Panel A: OLS
Risk Score -0.29 -19.20 -6.33 -38.84 -73.83*
(10.10) (17.02) (20.77) (25.34) (36.63)
αc · Post 1.39 -0.35 -1.10 2.49 2.96
Panel B: TSLS
Risk Score -87.03* -102.81*** -161.89**
(49.25) (36.52) (65.25)
First-stage F-stat 2.00 10.01 4.26 11.11 22.90
Over-id p-value – 0.28 – 0.38 0.13
αc· Post -0.00 0.48 -3.89
∆Risk ·β̂T SLS 1.57 2.57 5.83
Contract low high high high high
Service area risk >50% ≤50% ≤25%
y mean 65.86 71.04 71.77 70.37 64.51
N 1,280 669 396 228 116
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Notes: Table shows the effect of risk scores on the HEDIS outcomes, measured in percent-
ages with chronic conditions controlled. Panel A shows the OLS estimates. Panel B shows
two-stage-least-squares (TSLS) estimates where contract-level risk scores are instrumented
by the correlation between Part D premiums and county risk scores in the service area.
Specifically, instruments are constructed as Corr < pct−2, Rc0 >, where pct−2 is the Part D
premiums in contract c and year t − 2, and Rc0 is the baseline coding-adjusted county
risk scores in the service area of contract c. We construct additional instruments using
correlations with health-adjusted diabetes and hypertension prevalence rates in Rc0. The
instruments strongly predicted contract-level risk scores in high-quality contracts (col-
umn 2), with effects concentrated in high-selection contracts serving lower-risk counties
(column 4-5). For these contracts, we calculate quality value-added in αc·Post, and gains
from selecting lower risk types in ∆Risk ·β̂T SLS . We show p-values from over-identification
tests. To increase statistical power, we use plan-year observations in the table. We obtain
stronger first-stage prediction and similar IV estimates when the endogenous variable is
plan rather than contract risk score and when we control for plan-level fixed effects and
contract-level value-added. Robust standard errors clustered at the level of contracts in
the parenthesis.
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Notes: Panel (a) shows the raw trend of risk scores for baseline high- and low-quality contracts. Risk scores
are aggregated from plan risk scores weighted by enrollment. Panel (b) plots the event study estimates
on the differential change in high-quality risk scores controlling for contract and year fixed effects. 95%
confidence intervals are plotted based on robust standard errors clustered at the level of contracts.
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Notes: Figure plots the kernel density of risk scores for high-quality contracts in panel (a), and for low-quality
contracts in panel (b). Separate densities are drawn for the pre- (2009-2010) and post-QBP (2011-2014)
period. Risk scores are at the level of contracts aggregated from plan risk scores weighted by enrollment.
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Notes: Figure plots the quantile difference-in-differences estimates on deciles of risk scores in panel (a), and
the change-in-changes estimates in panel (b). 95% confidence intervals based on bootstrapped standard
errors are plotted. A tabulated version of the results listing point estimates, standard errors, and the baseline
deciles of high-quality risk scores is available in Appendix Table A3.
50







2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
ACA QBP
low−quality high−quality + <50% risk











2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
ACA QBP
high−quality + <50% risk high−quality vs. >50% risk










2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
ACA QBP
low−quality high−quality + <25% risk
high−quality + >75% risk













2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
ACA QBP
high−quality + <25% risk high−quality + >75% risk
Notes. Panel (a) shows the raw trends of risk scores in high-quality contracts above and below the median
service area risk (0.975) and in low-quality contracts. Panel (b) shows the event study estimates separately
for high-quality contracts above and below the median service area risk. Plotted 95% confidence intervals
are based on robust standard errors clustered at the level of contracts. Panel (c) plots the raw trends of risk
scores in high-quality contracts across the 25% tails of the service area risk (below 0.902 or above 1.007) and
in low-quality contracts. Corresponding event study estimates are shown in panel (d).
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Notes. Figure plots the raw trends of Part D premiums in the left panels and event study estimates of the
within-contract variation over county risk scores in the right panels. The raw trends in panel (a) plot the
premium levels above and below the median risk county within an average low-quality contract (dotted
lines) and an average high-quality contract (solid lines). Panel (c) restricts the within-contract locations to
the lower and upper 15% tails of county risk score, and plot premium levels across 15% tails for an average
low-quality contract (dotted lines) and an average high-quality contract (solid line). Corresponding event
study estimates in panel (b) and (d) show the within-contract variation over continuous risk scores. Plotted
95% confidence intervals are based on robust standard errors clustered two-way at the level of counties and
contracts.
52
Figure 6: Outcome ratings by quality and service area risks, event study
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Notes. Figure shows the dynamics of outcome ratings by baseline quality and service area risk. High-quality
contracts are restricted to those rated 4.5 stars and above in the baseline, or the higher-rated contracts. The
left panels plot separate trends for sub-groups of higher-rated contracts with service area risk scores below
the median (0.975) and in the lower 25% (less than 0.902) of high-quality contracts, and for low-quality
contracts. The right panels show the event study estimates from difference-in-differences specifications
comparing ratings in (sub-groups of) higher-rated contracts with the low-quality controls. Panel (a) and (b)
look at the average ratings of outcome measures. Panel (c) and (d) look at the health improvement measures
reported in the Health Outcome Survey (HOS). Panel (e) and (f) look at measures of managing diabetes and
blood pressure from the Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS). Event study graphs
show 95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors clustered at the level of contracts.
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Figure 7: Within-contract correlations between risk scores and HEDIS outcome ratings
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Notes. Figure plots the distribution of correlation coefficients between HEDIS outcome ratings in year t and
risk scores in year t − 3 (panel a), t − 2 (panel b), t − 1 (panel c), and year t (panel d). The coefficients are
calculated within contracts over time, grouped by the baseline contract quality. The middle line represents
the median coefficient. The lower and upper edges of the box bound the 25th-75th percentile. The antennas
reach the nearest observations outside. The plus (+) marks the mean coefficient.
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Figure 8: Effect on Part D premium, within-contract variation over health-adjusted
diabetes prevalence rates, high-selection contracts, event study
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Notes. Figure plots the raw trends of Part D premiums in the left panels and event study estimates of the
within-contract variation over county differences in health-adjusted diabetes prevalence rates in the right
panels. The health-adjusted prevalence rate multiplies the raw prevalence rate by the coding-adjusted
county risk score. We restrict within-contract locations to counties in the lower and upper 15% of baseline
prevalence rates in the contract’s service area. The raw trends plot the price levels across the 15% tails
within an average low-quality contract (dotted lines) and an average high-selection contract (solid lines)
below the median service area risk (0.975) in panel (a), and below the 25th percentile (0.902) in panel (c).
Corresponding event study estimates in panel (b) and (d) show the within-contract variation over county
differences in continuous prevalence rates. Plotted 95% confidence intervals are based on robust standard
errors clustered two-way at the level of counties and contracts.
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Figure 9: Effects of selection on the quality rating and overpayments
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Notes. Figure shows the effect of adjusting risk selection on the overall star ratings of high-selection contracts
in panel (a) and on the payments to these contracts in panel (b). Panel (a) plots for each overall star rating
level in 2014 (horizontal axis) the percentage of enrollees receiving lower (by 1 star or 0.5 star) or higher (by
0.5 star or unchanged) star ratings upon adjustment for selected risk scores. The adjustment holds the risk
composition at the 2010 level (corresponding to 2012 rating), and re-calculates the star rating discarding
the effect of selected risk scores since 2011. Based on the changes in panel (a), panel (b) shows changes in
the payments across 2014 star ratings. We assume that contracts receiving a downgrade (upgrade) in the
star rating adjust bids downward (upward) relative to the new benchmarks such that rebates to enrollees
remain unchanged. The behavioral assumption is supported by our empirical analysis of bidding and pricing
strategies at the contract level. Overpayments are the amount saved when the effect of selected risk scores
since 2011 is removed from the star rating. We show overpayments by 2014 star ratings with and without
weighting by enrollment.
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Figure 10: Effect on market shares, cross-county variation, event study
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Notes. Figures shows the cross-county variation in market shares at the level of contracts in panel (a) and (b),
and by high and low quality in panel (c) and (d). Quality-level market shares are constructed for a balanced
panel of quality-county-years where counties with masked enrollment data in some but not all years receive
zero market shares in years with missing enrollments. Event study estimates in panel (b) and (d) show the
variation in market shares over continuous county risk scores. Plotted 95% confidence intervals are based
on robust standard errors clustered two-way at the level of contracts and counties in panel (b), and based on
robust standard errors clustered by counties in panel (d). Raw trends in panel (a) and (c) show differences in




Table A1: Quality differences before and after QBP, and the effect of current-period ratings on risk scores
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
≥4.0 stars risk score risk score risk score
High · Post 0.081 0.051 -0.026*** -0.041*** -0.035*** -0.042*** -0.020*** -0.050***
(0.076) (0.073) (0.008) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.007) (0.016)
Star Rating 0.003 -0.016 -0.003 -0.022 0 -0.036***
(0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.014) (0.005) (0.011)
Weights unweighted plan enrollment equal weights unweighted
Fixed Effects contract contract contract plan
y mean 0.29 0.29 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96
R2 0.59 0.46 0.86 0.007 0.76 0.012 0.79 0.016
N 1,122 1,127 1,122 1,127 1,122 1,122 4,549 4,549
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Notes: Table shows difference-in-differences estimates on current period star rating ≥4.0 stars in column 1-2, and on risk scores in column
3-8. Different from the main results in Table 3, column 3-8 also control for current period star ratings in the difference-in-differences
specification. We find that quality differences are stable before and after the QBP: baseline high-quality contracts continue to score above
4.0 stars relative to baseline low-quality contracts (column 1-2). Current period star ratings have little effect on risk scores, particularly in
specifications with contract or plan fixed effects. The main difference-in-differences estimates barely change with controls of current
period star ratings. Standard errors clustered at the level of contracts (column 1-8) or plans (column 7-8) in the parenthesis.
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Table A2: Effect of QBP on risk scores, excluding 5-star contract-years
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
High · Post -0.024*** -0.040*** -0.035*** -0.041*** -0.017** -0.043***
(0.008) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.008) (0.016)
Weights plan enrollment equal weights unweighted
Fixed Effects contract contract plan
y mean 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96
R2 0.86 0.005 0.76 0.011 0.78 0.008
N 1,112 1,117 1,112 1,117 4,332 4,502
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Notes: Table shows difference-in-differences estimates on risk scores. Column 1-2 show the effects on
contract risk scores aggregated from plan risk scores weighted by enrollment. Column 3-4 show the effects on
contract risk scores as simple averages across plans. Column 5-6 show the effects on plan risk scores. 5-star
contract-years are excluded from the sample. We control for contract or plan fixed effects in the odd-numbered
columns, and show the cross-sectional differences in the even-numbered columns. Standard errors clustered
at the level of linked contracts (column 1-4) or plans (column 5-6) in the parenthesis.
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Table A3: Distributional effects of QBP on risk scores
(I) (II) (III)
Difference-in-Differences Change-in-Changes Baseline High
10% -0.042* -0.045** 0.848
(0.022) (0.026)
20% -0.087*** -0.074*** 0.919
(0.023) (0.021)
30% -0.065*** -0.064*** 0.951
(0.021) (0.020)
40% -0.042*** -0.045*** 0.966
(0.016) (0.017)
50% -0.028* -0.032** 0.980
(0.017) (0.016)
60% -0.016 -0.021 1.002
(0.019) (0.020)
70% -0.016 -0.013 1.026
(0.019) (0.021)
80% -0.022 -0.031 1.057
(0.017) (0.019)
90% -0.024 -0.014 1.096
(0.033) (0.024)
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Notes: Table shows the distributional effect of QBP on the deciles of risk score in high-quality
contracts relative to the low-quality contracts. Estimates are from a quantile difference-in-
differences specification in column 1, and from a change-in-changes specification in column 2.
Bootstrapped standard errors from 100 replications in the parenthesis. Column 3 shows the
baseline (2009-2010) deciles of high-quality risk scores.
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Table A4: Effect on risk scores, high-quality (≥4.0 stars) and higher-rated contracts (≥4.5
stars), by service area risks
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Treat · Post -0.026*** -0.040*** -0.046*** -0.032*** -0.050*** -0.032
(0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.019) (0.021)
Treat ≥4.0 ≥4.5 ≥4.5 + risk ≥4.5 + risk
Service area risk < median > median < 25% > 75%
Control low-quality low-quality low-quality
y mean 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
R2 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.86
N 1,122 901 833 843 801 808
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Notes: Table shows difference-in-differences estimates on the risk scores of high-quality contracts (rated
4.0 stars and above) in column 1, and on the risk scores of higher-rated contracts (4.5 stars and above in the
baseline) in column 2-6. Column 3-4 divide higher-rated contracts by the median service area risk score (0.975)
in high-quality contracts. Column 5-6 show results on higher-rated contracts in the lower (below 0.902) and
upper 25% (above 1.007) of service area risk scores of high-quality contracts. All specifications control for
contract fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the level of contracts in the parenthesis.
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Table A5: Effect of QBP on Part D premiums, within-contract variation, high-quality, higher-
rated, and 5-star contracts
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII)
Risk · High · Post 16.98** 19.27 14.64*
(7.98) (13.07) (7.83)
Risk · Post -4.75 14.76** 20.21* 14.76* -4.32 -3.84 -4.62
(5.17) (6.99) (11.02) (7.85) (4.97) (5.15) (5.17)
High · Post 3.50* 5.34** 0.74
(1.90) (2.33) (1.90)
Counties 15% tails
Contracts low ≥4.0 ≥4.5 5.0 (2) vs. (1) (3) vs. (1) (4) vs. (1)
y mean 17.46 27.60 30.39 15.58 20.22 18.87 17.42
R2 0.75 0.70 0.73 0.88 0.75 0.76 0.75
N 4,393 1,641 535 155 6,034 4,928 4,530
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Notes: Table shows the within-contract variation in Part D premiums over county risk scores. We examine
heterogeneous effects on high-quality contracts by the baseline ratings and 5-star status over the sample period.
Column 1-3 show the difference-in-differences estimates on the premium variation in low-quality (baseline
ratings below 4.0 stars, high-quality (4.0 stars and above), and higher-rated contracts (4.5 stars and above),
respectively. Column 4 shows the difference-in-differences estimate on contracts ever achieving a 5-star rating
after 2012 and hence subject to year-round enrollments in the contract. Column 5-7 show the triple-difference
estimates on the differential variation in high-quality contracts defined in column 2-4, respectively. We restrict
within-contract locations to the lower and upper 15% of county risk scores in the contract’s service area. All
regressions control for contract-county fixed effects. Standard errors clustered two-way at the level of contracts






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A8: Effect of QBP on the total premium (Part C and D), within-contract
variation
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Risk · High · Post 30.51** 35.61**
(12.54) (14.26)
Risk · Post -14.99* 20.99* -14.75* -13.49 21.64 -14.66*
(8.73) (11.20) (8.66) (8.88) (13.37) (8.60)
High · Post -1.25 -1.16
(4.86) (4.83)
Counties all 15% tails
Contracts low high all low high all
y mean 42.93 78.55 52.69 42.44 75.47 51.42
R2 0.85 0.85 0.87 0.85 0.86 0.87
N 14,861 5,611 20,472 4,393 1,641 6,034
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Notes: Table shows the within-contract variation in total premiums over county risk scores.
Column 1-2 show the difference-in-differences estimates on the premium variation in low- and
high-quality contracts, respectively. Column 3 shows the triple-difference estimate on the dif-
ferential variation in high-quality contracts. Column 4-6 repeat the analysis but restrict the
within-contract locations to the lower and upper 15% of county risk scores in the contract’s service
area. All regressions control for contract-county fixed effects. Standard errors clustered two-way
at the level of contracts and counties in the parenthesis.
8
Table A9: Effect of QBP on drug deductibles, within-contract variation
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Risk · High · Post -7.06 -22.48
(46.09) (52.21)
Risk · Post 36.54* 48.45 39.25** 33.62** 29.33 35.50**
(18.78) (46.03) (19.46) (16.87) (51.01) (17.26)
High · Post -12.10 -13.42
(10.02) (9.52)
Counties all 15% tails
Contracts low high all low high all
y mean 30.05 24.92 28.65 28.62 24.91 27.61
R2 0.70 0.61 0.67 0.68 0.67 0.68
N 14,861 5,611 20,472 4,393 1,641 6,034
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Notes: Table shows the within-contract variation in drug deductibles over county risk scores. Column
1-2 show the difference-in-differences estimates on the variation in low- and high-quality contracts,
respectively. Column 3 shows the triple-difference estimate on the differential variation in high-quality
contracts. Column 4-6 repeat the analysis but restrict the within-contract locations to the lower and upper
15% of county risk scores in the contract’s service area. All regressions control for contract-county fixed
effects. Standard errors clustered two-way at the level of contracts and counties in the parenthesis.
9
Table A10: Effect of QBP on Part D premiums over income, within-contract variation
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
County variation in Treat: per capita income p.c. transfer income
(thousands) (thousands)
Treat · High · Post -0.15 0.27
(0.14) (0.70)
Treat · Post -0.011 -0.13 -0.0026 0.035 0.14 0.0059
(0.033) (0.13) (0.034) (0.25) (0.66) (0.24)
High · Post 2.50 3.33
(2.38) (2.18)
Counties 15% tails 15% tails
Contracts low high all low high all
y mean 17.67 28.38 20.73 17.86 27.81 20.62
R2 0.77 0.66 0.76 0.75 0.69 0.75
N 4,385 1,753 6,138 4,498 1,726 6,224
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Notes: Table shows the within-contract variation in Part D premiums over county differences in
per capita income (column 1-3) and per capita transfer income (column 4-6). County risk score
is negatively associated with income, and positively associated with transfer income. We show
separate difference-in-differences estimates on low- and high-quality contracts, followed by the triple-
difference estimate on high quality. We restrict locations to counties in the lower or upper 15% of the
income distribution within the contract’s service area. All regressions include contract-county fixed
effects. Standard errors clustered two-way at the level of contracts and counties in the parenthesis.
10
Table A11: Effect of QBP on Part D premiums over socio-economic status, within-
contract variation
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
County variation in Treat: white (%) some college (%)
Treat · High · Post -0.15 0.075
(0.15) (0.066)
Treat · Post 0.021 -0.17 0.016 -0.058 0.029 -0.057
(0.026) (0.14) (0.025) (0.043) (0.059) (0.044)
High · Post 2.04 1.32
(2.60) (2.72)
Counties 15% tails 15% tails
Contracts low high all low high all
y mean 17.43 28.83 20.57 17.89 28.36 20.81
R2 0.76 0.66 0.76 0.75 0.65 0.75
N 4,479 1,703 6,182 4,729 1,833 6,562
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Notes: Table shows the within-contract variation in Part D premiums over county differences in
socio-economic status (SES), proxied by percent White in column 1-3 and percent having some college
education in column 4-6. County risk score is negatively associated with both measures of SES. We
show separate difference-in-differences estimates on low- and high-quality contracts, followed by the
triple-difference estimate on high quality. We restrict locations to counties in the lower or upper 15% of
the SES distribution within the contract’s service area. All regressions include contract-county fixed

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A13: Effect of QBP on Part D premiums over provider quality, within-contract
variation
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
County variation in Treat: hospital re-admission (%) preventable hospital stay (%)
Treat · High · Post 0.36* 0.39
(0.20) (0.28)
Treat · Post -0.23 0.21 -0.20 -0.043 0.26 -0.053
(0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18)
High · Post 2.89 2.09
(2.00) (2.25)
Counties 15% tails 15% tails
Contracts low high all low high all
y mean 17.30 27.98 20.20 17.41 27.98 20.18
R2 0.76 0.69 0.76 0.76 0.67 0.76
N 4,336 1,618 5,954 4,381 1,555 5,936
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Notes: Table shows the within-contract variation in Part D premiums over county differences
in provider quality, measured by hospital re-admission for inpatient care in column 1-3, and
preventable hospital stay for outpatient care in column 4-6. Risk score is positively associated with
both measures, or negatively associated with quality. We show separate difference-in-differences
estimates on low- and high-quality contracts, followed by the triple-difference estimate on high
quality. We restrict locations to counties in the lower or upper 15% of the quality distribution
within the contract’s service area. All regressions include contract-county fixed effects. Standard














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A17: Effect of QBP on rebates, within-contract variation
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Risk · High · Post -44.41* -71.57***
(24.19) (25.80)
Risk · Post 32.07* -16.15 -45.87** 33.58* 33.10*
(17.80) (16.73) (19.94) (18.22) (17.85)
High · Post 5.07 -0.54
(3.76) (4.39)
Counties 15% tails
Contracts low high high + (2) vs. (1) (3) vs. (1)
Service area risk < 50%
y mean 68.03 60.66 49.25 66.03 65.31
R2 0.80 0.78 0.80 0.80 0.80
N 4,393 1,641 743 6,034 5,136
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Notes: Table shows the within-contract variation in rebates over county risk scores. We
restrict locations to the lower and upper 15% of county risk scores in the contract’s service
area. Column 1-2 show the difference-in-differences estimates on the variation in low-
and high-quality contracts, respectively. Column 3 restricts high-quality contracts to
those below the median service area risk (0.975) in the baseline, or the high-selection
contracts. Column 4 (5) shows the triple-difference estimate on the differential variation
in high-quality (high-selection) contracts. All regressions include contract-county fixed
effects. Robust standard errors clustered two-way at the level of contracts and counties in
the parenthesis.
17
Table A18: Effect of QBP on the total premium (Part C and D), within-contract variation,
high-selection contracts
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII)
Risk · High · Post 35.61** 50.73** 63.63***
(14.26) (21.00) (21.25)
Risk · Post -13.49 21.64 38.33* 55.94** -14.66* -13.51 -13.46
(8.88) (13.37) (20.38) (19.92) (8.60) (8.73) (8.85)
High · Post -1.16 2.40 -1.04
(4.83) (5.22) (8.62)
Counties 15% tails
Contracts low high (+ service area risk) (2)-(1) (3)-(1) (4)-(1)
Service area risk <50% <25%
y mean 42.44 75.47 92.11 101.46 51.42 49.62 47.60
R2 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.81 0.87 0.87 0.86
N 4,393 1,641 743 421 6,034 5,136 4,814
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Notes: Table shows the within-contract variation in total premiums (Part C + D) over county risk scores. We
restrict the within-contract locations to the lower or upper 15% of county risk scores in the contract’s service
area. Column 1 and 2 show the difference-in-differences estimates of the variation in low- and high-quality
contracts, respectively. Column 3 restricts high-quality contracts to those below the median service area
risk (0.975) in the baseline, or the high-selection contracts. Column 4 further restricts high-selection
contracts to those below the 25th percentile of service area risk (0.902) in the baseline. Column 5 shows the
triple-difference estimate on the differential variation in high-quality contracts relative to the low-quality
contracts. Column 6 and 7 show the tripe-difference estimates on the high-selection contracts defined in
column 3 and 4, respectively. All regressions include contract-county fixed effects. Standard errors clustered
two-way at the level of contracts and counties in the parenthesis.
18
Table A19: Effect of QBP on Part C premiums, within-contract variation, un-
weighted by enrollment
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Risk · High · Post 15.97 19.19
(12.04) (13.71)
Risk · Post -11.32* 7.72 -10.75 -10.10 8.86 -10.26
(6.65) (11.55) (6.69) (7.00) (12.28) (6.86)
High · Post -3.10 -3.96
(3.44) (3.53)
Counties all 15% tails
Contracts low high all low high all
y mean 26.92 49.55 33.12 26.73 48.21 32.57
R2 0.76 0.80 0.79 0.76 0.82 0.79
N 14,861 5,611 20,472 4,393 1,641 6,034
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Notes: Table shows the within-contract variation in Part C premiums over county risk scores.
Different from the main analysis, contract-county prices are aggregated from plan prices taking
simple averages, unweighted by enrollment. Column 1-2 show the difference-in-differences
estimates on the variation in low- and high-quality contracts, respectively. Column 3 shows
the triple-differences estimate on the differential variation in high-quality contracts. Column
4-6 repeat the analysis but restrict the within-contract locations to the lower and upper 15%
of county risk scores in the contract’s service area. All regressions control for contract-county
fixed effects. Standard errors clustered two-way at the level of contracts and counties in the
parenthesis.
19
Table A20: Effect of QBP on Part D premiums, within-contract variation, un-
weighted by enrollment
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Risk · High · Post 16.45*** 18.53**
(7.54) (8.34)
Risk · Post -5.07 15.58** -4.15 -5.05 14.92* -4.65
(4.86) (6.69) (4.82) (4.77) (7.82) (4.67)
High · Post 2.25 2.98
(2.14) (1.80)
Counties all 15% tails
Contracts low high all low high all
y mean 18.78 29.37 21.68 18.50 28.59 21.24
R2 0.74 0.66 0.74 0.73 0.69 0.74
N 14,861 5,611 20,472 4,393 1,641 6,034
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Notes: Table shows the within-contract variation in Part D premiums over county risk scores.
Different from the main analysis, contract-county prices are aggregated from plan prices taking
simple averages, unweighted by enrollment. Column 1-2 show the difference-in-differences
estimates on the variation in low- and high-quality contracts, respectively. Column 3 shows the
triple-differences estimate on the differential variation in high-quality contracts. Column 4-6
repeat the analysis but restrict the within-contract locations to the lower and upper 15% of county
risk scores in the contract’s service area. All regressions control for contract-county fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered two-way at the level of contracts and counties in the parenthesis.
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Table A21: Effect of QBP on drug deductibles, within-contract variation, unweighted
by enrollment
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Risk · High · Post -25.18 -22.04
(43.50) (51.92)
Risk · Post 64.36** 58.54 65.77*** 66.97** 63.30 67.24***
(24.89) (41.96) (24.97) (25.68) (46.92) (25.58)
High · Post -10.53 -12.88
(11.29) (10.66)
Counties all 15% tails
Contracts low high all low high all
y mean 31.14 27.83 29.08 28.09 26.29 28.32
R2 0.66 0.52 0.63 0.65 0.55 0.62
N 14,861 5,611 20,472 4,393 1,641 6,034
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Notes: Table shows the within-contract variation in drug deductibles over county risk scores. Different
from the main analysis, contract-county prices are aggregated from plan prices taking simple averages,
unweighted by enrollment. Column 1-2 show the difference-in-differences estimates on the variation
in low- and high-quality contracts, respectively. Column 3 shows the triple-differences estimate on
the differential variation in high-quality contracts. Column 4-6 repeat the analysis but restrict the
within-contract locations to the lower and upper 15% of county risk scores in the contract’s service
area. All regressions control for contract-county fixed effects. Standard errors clustered two-way at










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A23: Effect of QBP on Part C premiums, within-contract variation, dis-
tance to mean
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Risk · High · Post 11.75 15.26
(14.18) (14.84)
Risk · Post -10.56 1.10 -11.34* -8.83 3.39 -10.39
(6.86) (13.44) (6.67) (6.94) (14.25) (6.66)
High · Post -3.61 -4.60
(3.76) (3.98)
Counties all 15% tails
Contracts low high all low high all
y mean 25.17 49.94 31.96 24.97 47.87 31.20
R2 0.77 0.85 0.82 0.77 0.85 0.82
N 14,861 5,611 20,472 4,393 1,641 6,034
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Notes: Table shows the within-contract variation in Part C premiums over county risk scores.
County differences in risk scores are measured as the distance to the mean county risk in the
service area, as opposed to the distance-to-median measure in the main analysis. Column 1-2
show the difference-in-differences estimates on the variation in low- and high-quality contracts,
respectively. Column 3 shows the triple-difference estimate on the differential variation in
high-quality contracts. Column 4-6 repeat the analysis but restrict the within-contract locations
to the lower and upper 15% of county risk scores in the contract’s service area. All regressions
control for contract-county fixed effects. Standard errors clustered two-way at the level of
contracts and counties in the parenthesis.
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Table A24: Effect of QBP on Part D premiums, within-contract variation, distance
to mean
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Risk · High · Post 14.64* 17.74**
(7.66) (8.65)
Risk · Post -2.87 17.16** -1.80 -4.09 16.19** -3.65
(4.70) (7.16) (4.57) (5.16) (7.73) (4.96)
High · Post 2.43 3.51
(2.29) (1.89)
Counties all 15% tails
Contracts low high all low high all
y mean 17.77 28.60 20.74 17.46 27.60 20.22
R2 0.76 0.67 0.75 0.75 0.70 0.75
N 14,861 5,611 20,472 4,393 1,641 6,034
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Notes: Table shows the within-contract variation in Part D premiums over county risk scores.
County differences in risk scores are measured as the distance to the mean county risk in the
service area, as opposed to the distance-to-median measure in the main analysis. Column 1-2
show the difference-in-differences estimates on the variation in low- and high-quality contracts,
respectively. Column 3 shows the triple-difference estimate on the differential variation in high-
quality contracts. Column 4-6 repeat the analysis but restrict the within-contract locations to the
lower and upper 15% of county risk scores in the contract’s service area. All regressions control
for contract-county fixed effects. Standard errors clustered two-way at the level of contracts and
counties in the parenthesis.
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Table A25: Effect of QBP on drug deductibles, within-contract variation, distance
to mean
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Risk · High · Post -38.25 -33.03
(46.29) (50.93)
Risk · Post 22.08 42.13** 44.76** 36.31** 21.34 38.37**
(44.70) (19.14) (19.47) (17.23) (49.49) (17.50)
High · Post -12.03 -13.44
(9.98) (9.50)
Counties all 15% tails
Contracts low high all low high all
y mean 30.05 24.92 28.65 28.62 24.91 27.61
R2 0.61 0.70 0.67 0.68 0.67 0.68
N 5,611 14,861 20,472 4,393 1,641 6,034
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Notes: Table shows the within-contract variation in drug deductibles over county risk scores.
County differences in risk scores are measured as the distance to the mean county risk in the service
area, as opposed to the distance-to-median measure in the main analysis. Column 1-2 show the
difference-in-differences estimates on the variation in low- and high-quality contracts, respectively.
Column 3 shows the triple-difference estimate on the differential variation in high-quality contracts.
Column 4-6 repeat the analysis but restrict the within-contract locations to the lower and upper 15%
of county risk scores in the contract’s service area. All regressions control for contract-county fixed




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A27: Weight increase and the composition of measures in the overall star rating
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Measures in Rating Outcome Access Process
Rating · Post 0.15*** 0.23*** -0.12*** 0.086 -0.042 -0.022
(0.036) (0.073) (0.027) (0.011) (0.034) (0.086)
Rating 0.45*** 0.32*** 0.78*** 0.59*** 0.97*** 0.86***
(0.037) (0.082) (0.025) (0.067) (0.026) (0.068)
Baseline quality all ≥4.0 all ≥4.0 all ≥4.0
y mean 3.41 4.10 3.40 4.09 3.40 4.09
R2 0.49 0.41 0.68 0.39 0.71 0.57
N 1,640 331 1,692 338 1,692 338
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Notes: Table estimates the change in the contribution of outcome, access, and process measures to the
overall star rating due to the weight increase in 2012. Overall star ratings are regressed on ratings of
component measures using contract-year observations of quality ratings. Column 1-2 estimate the
contribution of outcome measures to the overall rating, where weights increased from 1.0 to 3.0 in
2012. Column 3-4 estimate the contribution of access measures, where weights increased from 1.0
to 1.5 in 2012. Column 5-6 look at the process measures where the weights are unchanged. Even-
numbered columns show separate estimates for high-quality contracts with at least a 4.0 star rating or




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A36: Effect of QBP on market shares, across county risks
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Risk · High · Post -0.90** -0.19**
(0.35) (0.074)
Risk · Post -0.38*** -1.18*** -0.36*** -0.14*** -0.24*** -0.095*
(0.12) (0.34) (0.11) (0.050) (0.045) (0.050)
High · Post 0.88** 0.15**
(0.36) (0.072)




Quality low high all low high all
y mean 0.31 0.38 0.33 0.28 0.13 0.20
R2 0.64 0.64 0.58 0.73 0.76 0.33
N 15,327 5,660 21,106 17,236 17,236 34,508
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Notes: Table shows the effect on the market shares of Medicare Advantage contracts over county
risk scores in column 1-3, and the effect on quality-level market shares in column 4-6. Quality-level
market shares are constructed for a balanced panel of quality-county-years where counties with masked
enrollment data in some but not all years receive zero market shares in years with missing enrollments.
Column 1-3 control for contract, county, and year fixed effects, and cluster standard errors two-way at
the level of contracts and counties in the parenthesis. Column 4-6 control for county, year, and quality
fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the level of contracts in the parenthesis. Average market
share (y mean) is in lower in column 4-6 due to zero market shares in the balanced panel.
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Table A37: Effect of selection on the HEDIS outcomes, high-selection
contracts
(I) (II) (III)
blood sugar cholesterol blood pressure
controlled controlled controlled
Panel A: OLS
Risk Score -31.32 -37.97 -47.64
(34.30) (35.55) (34.32)
αc · Post -0.032 5.56 2.10
Panel B: TSLS
Risk Score -144.89* -161.76*** -8.01
(87.67) (32.28) (37.38)
First-stage F-stat 11.23 11.23 11.11
Over-id p-value 0.40 0.28 0.35
αc· Post -2.73 -0.65 5.01
∆Risk ·β̂T SLS 3.62 4.04 0.20
y mean 82.49 60.46 68.50
N 226 226 228
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Notes: Table shows the effect of risk scores on the three HEDIS outcomes, measured in
percentages with the chronic condition controlled. Panel A shows the OLS estimates.
Panel B shows two-stage-least-squares (TSLS) estimates where contract-level risk
scores are instrumented by the correlation between Part D premiums and county
risk scores in the service area. Specifically, instruments are constructed as Corr <
pct−2, Rc0 >, where pct−2 is the Part D premiums in contract c and year t −2, and Rc0 is
the baseline coding-adjusted county risk scores in the service area of contract c. We
construct additional instruments using correlations with health-adjusted diabetes and
hypertension prevalence rates in Ri0. We show results for high-selection contracts –
high-quality contracts with with below-median service area risk scores (<0.975), and
calculate quality value-added in αc·Post and gains from selecting lower risk types in
∆Risk ·β̂T SLS . We show p-values from over-identification tests. To increase statistical
power, we use plan-year observations in the table. We obtain stronger first-stage
prediction and similar IV estimates when the endogenous variable is plan rather
than contract risk score and when we control for plan-level fixed effects and contract-
level value-added. Robust standard errors clustered at the level of contracts in the
parenthesis.
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Table A38: Effect of selection on the star ratings of outcome, access, and process
measures, high-selection contracts
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
outcome ratings access ratings process ratings
Panel A: OLS
Risk Score -2.93** -1.48 0.69 3.18 -2.26*** -2.06
(1.50) (2.54) (2.51) (4.32) (0.83) (1.52)
αc · Post 0.51 0.65 0.10 0.20 0.18 0.16
Panel B: TSLS
Risk Score -18.48*** -14.66* -1.86 0.046 0.035 3.82
(6.73) (7.74) (2.37) (5.80) (4.28) (3.48)
First-stage F-stat 7.42 10.85 7.42 10.85 7.42 10.85
Over-id p-value 0.98 0.23 0.42 0.52 0.33 0.53
αc· Post 0.19 0.16 0.02 0.12 0.09 0.29
∆Risk ·β̂T SLS 0.46 0.53 0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.14
Service area risk ≤50% ≤25% ≤50% ≤25% ≤50% ≤25%
y mean 3.85 3.64 4.18 4.11 3.77 3.60
N 234 122 234 122 234 122
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Notes: Table shows the effect of risk scores on the star ratings of outcome, access, and process
measures, where the dependent variable is the average rating across measures in the weighting
category. Specifically, outcome measures include all measures receiving 3.0 weights in the overall
star rating in a given year. Access (Process) measures include all measures receiving 1.5 (1.0) weights
in the overall star rating in a given year. Panel A shows the OLS estimates. Panel B shows two-stage-
least-squares (TSLS) estimates where contract-level risk scores are instrumented by the correlation
between Part D premiums and county risk scores in the service area. Specifically, instruments are
constructed as Corr < pct−2, Ri0 >, where pct−2 is the Part D premiums in contract c and year t −2,
and Rc0 is the baseline coding-adjusted county risk scores in the service area of contract c. We
construct additional instruments using correlations with health-adjusted diabetes and hypertension
prevalence rates in Rc0. We show results for high-selection contracts – high-quality contracts with
with below-median service area risk scores (<0.975) in odd-numbered columns, and those in the
lower 25% (<0.902) in even-numbered columns. We calculate quality value-added in αc·Post and
gains from selecting lower risk types in ∆Risk ·β̂T SLS . We show p-values from over-identification
tests. To increase statistical power, we use plan-year observations in the table. We obtain stronger
first-stage prediction and similar IV estimates when the endogenous variable is plan rather than
contract risk score and when we control for plan-level fixed effects and contract-level value-added.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes. Figure plots the kernel density of high-quality risk scores in panel (a), and that of low-quality
risk scores in panel (b). Separate density is drawn for each year. Risk scores are at the level of contracts
aggregated from plan risk scores weighted by enrollment.















































Notes. Figure plots the kernel density of plan risk scores in high-quality contracts in panel (a), and that in
low-quality contracts in panel (b). Separate density is drawn for each year. Although quality is assigned at
the level of contracts, this figure plots the plan risk score distributions.
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ACA QBP
low−quality high−quality
Notes. Figure shows the raw trends of benchmarks in panel (a), bids in panel (b), the difference between
benchmarks and bids in panel (c), and rebates in panel (d). All variables are at the level of contract aggregated
from plan variables weighted by enrollment. Quality bonus adjustments are included in benchmarks and
rebates.
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Figure B4: Effect on premiums and drug deductibles, raw trends
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Notes. Figure shows the raw trends of Part C premium in panel (a), Part D premium in panel (b), drug
deductible in panel (c), and the share of zero-deductible plans in panel (d). All variables are at the level of
contract aggregated from plan variables weighted by enrollment.
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Notes. Figure plots the raw trends of Part C premiums in the left panels and event study estimates of the
within-contract variation over county risk scores in the right panels. The raw trends in panel (a) plot the
premium levels above and below the median risk county within an average low-quality contract (dotted
lines) and an average high-quality contract (solid lines). Panel (c) restricts the within-contract locations to
the lower and upper 15% tails of county risk score, and plot premium levels across 15% tails for an average
low-quality contract (dotted lines) and an average high-quality contract (solid line). Corresponding event
study estimates in panel (b) and (d) show the within-contract variation over continuous risk scores. Plotted
95% confidence intervals are based on robust standard errors clustered two-way at the level of counties and
contracts.
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Figure B6: Effect on zero-premium and zero-deductible plans and enrollment, 15% tail
counties, raw trend
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Notes. Figure plots the raw trends of zero-premium and zero-deductible plans in the left panels, and
enrollments in these plans in the right panels. Specifically, outcome variables in the left panel are the
percent of plans with zero premiums or drug deductible offered by the contract in a contract-county pair.
Outcome variables in the right panels are the share contributed by the contract-county pair among total
enrollment in zero-premium and zero-deductible plans offered by the contract. We restrict locations to
counties in the lower or upper 15% tails of county risk score in the contract’s service area. Each panel plots
the premium levels across the 15% risk tails for an average low-quality contract (dotted lines) and an average
high-quality contract (solid line).
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Notes. Figure plots the raw trends of total premiums in the left panels and event study estimates of the
within-contract variation over county risk scores in the right panels. The raw trends in panel (a) plot the
premium levels above and below the median risk county within an average low-quality contract (dotted
lines) and an average high-quality contract (solid lines). Panel (c) restricts the within-contract locations to
the lower and upper 15% tails of county risk score, and plot premium levels across 15% tails for an average
low-quality contract (dotted lines) and an average high-quality contract (solid line). Corresponding event
study estimates in panel (b) and (d) show the within-contract variation over continuous risk scores. Plotted
95% confidence intervals are based on robust standard errors clustered two-way at the level of counties and
contracts.
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Notes. Figure plots the raw trends of drug deductibles in the left panels and event study estimates of
the within-contract variation over county risk scores in the right panels. The raw trends in panel (a) plot
the price levels above and below the median risk county within an average low-quality contract (dotted
lines) and an average high-quality contract (solid lines). Panel (c) restricts the within-contract locations to
the lower and upper 15% tails of county risk score, and plot price levels across 15% tails for an average
low-quality contract (dotted lines) and an average high-quality contract (solid line). Corresponding event
study estimates in panel (b) and (d) show the within-contract variation over continuous risk scores. Plotted
95% confidence intervals are based on robust standard errors clustered two-way at the level of counties and
contracts.
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Notes. Figure plots the raw trends of Part C premiums in the left panels and event study estimates of
the within-contract variation over county risk scores in the right panels. Different from the main analysis,
contract-county prices are aggregated from plan prices taking simple averages, unweighted by enrollment.
The raw trends in panel (a) plot the premium levels above and below the median risk county within an
average low-quality contract (dotted lines) and an average high-quality contract (solid lines). Panel (c)
restricts the within-contract locations to the lower and upper 15% tails of county risk score in the contract’s
service area, and plot premium levels across 15% tails for an average low-quality contract (dotted lines) and
an average high-quality contract (solid lines). Corresponding event study estimates in panel (b) and (d)
show the within-contract variation over continuous risk scores. Plotted 95% confidence intervals are based
on robust standard errors clustered two-way at the level of counties and contracts.
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Notes. Figure plots the raw trends of Part D premiums in the left panels and event study estimates of
the within-contract variation over county risk scores in the right panels. Different from the main analysis,
contract-county prices are aggregated from plan prices taking simple averages, unweighted by enrollment.
The raw trends in panel (a) plot the premium levels above and below the median risk county within an
average low-quality contract (dotted lines) and an average high-quality contract (solid lines). Panel (c)
restricts the within-contract locations to the lower and upper 15% tails of county risk score in the contract’s
service area, and plot premium levels across 15% tails for an average low-quality contract (dotted lines) and
an average high-quality contract (solid lines). Corresponding event study estimates in panel (b) and (d)
show the within-contract variation over continuous risk scores. Plotted 95% confidence intervals are based
on robust standard errors clustered two-way at the level of counties and contracts.
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Notes. Figure plots the raw trends of drug deductibles in the left panels and event study estimates of the
within-contract variation over county risk scores in the right panels. Different from the main analysis,
contract-county prices are aggregated from plan prices taking simple averages, unweighted by enrollment.
The raw trends in panel (a) plot the price levels above and below the median risk county within an average
low-quality contract (dotted lines) and an average high-quality contract (solid lines). Panel (c) restricts the
within-contract locations to the lower and upper 15% tails of county risk score in the contract’s service
area, and plot the price levels across 15% tails for an average low-quality contract (dotted lines) and an
average high-quality contract (solid lines). Corresponding event study estimates in panel (b) and (d) show
the within-contract variation over continuous risk scores. Plotted 95% confidence intervals are based on
robust standard errors clustered two-way at the level of counties and contracts.
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Figure B12: Effect on median premiums and drug deductibles, within-contract variation,
event study
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Notes. Figure plots the raw trends of premiums and drug deductibles in the left panels and event study
estimates of the within-contract variation over county risk scores in the right panels. Different from the
main analysis, we aggregate plan prices to the contract-county level using the median plan price. We restrict
locations to the lower and upper 15% tails of county risk scores in the contract’s service area. The raw trends
plot the price levels across the 15% risk tails within an average low-quality contract (dotted lines) and an
average high-quality contract (solid lines). Corresponding event study estimates in the right panels show
the within-contract variation over continuous risk scores. Plotted 95% confidence intervals are based on
robust standard errors clustered two-way at the level of counties and contracts.
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Figure B13: Effect on premiums and drug deductibles, within-contract variation, event
study, distance to mean
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Notes. Figure plots the event study estimates of the within-contract variation over county risk scores. We
focus on Part C premiums in panel (a)-(b), Part D premiums in panel (c)-(d), and drug deductibles in
panel (e)-(f). County differences in risk scores are measured as the distance to the mean county risk in the
service area, as opposed to the distance-to-median measure in the main analysis. The right panels restrict
within-contract locations to the lower and upper 15% of county risk scores in the contract’s service area.
Plotted 95% confidence intervals are based on robust standard errors clustered two-way at the level of
counties and contracts.
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Notes. Figure shows the event study estimates of the relative contribution of outcome, access and process
measures to the overall star rating. The weight increase occurred in 2012. The left panel plots the results
from the full sample of contracts. The right panel shows separate results for high-quality contracts with
at least a 4.0 star or above in the baseline. 95% confidence intervals are plotted based on robust standard
errors clustered at the contract level.
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Figure B15: Outcome ratings by baseline enrollee risk scores, event study
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Notes. Figure shows the dynamics of outcome ratings by baseline enrollee risk scores. The raw trends in
the left panels plot separate trends for binary groups of contracts above and below the median enrollee
risk score (0.97) in the baseline. The right panels show event study estimates from difference-in-differences
specifications over continuous variation in the baseline risk score. Panel (a) and (b) look at the average rating
of outcome measures. Panel (c) and (d) look at the health improvement measures reported in the Health
Outcome Survey (HOS). Panel (e) and (f) look at measures of managing diabetes and blood pressure from
the Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS). Event study graphs show 95% confidence
intervals based on robust standard errors clustered at the level of contracts.
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Figure B16: Outcome ratings by quality and enrollee risk scores, event study
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Notes. Figure shows the dynamics of outcome ratings by baseline quality and enrollee risk scores. High-
quality contracts are restricted to those rated 4.5 stars and above in the baseline, or the higher-rated contracts.
The left panels plot separate trends for sub-groups of higher-rated contracts with enrollee risk scores above
the median (0.977) and in the upper 25% (greater than 1.041) of high-quality contracts, and for low-quality
contracts. The right panels show the event study estimates from difference-in-differences specifications
comparing ratings in (sub-groups of) higher-rated contracts with the low-quality controls. Panel (a) and (b)
look at the average ratings of outcome measures. Panel (c) and (d) look at the health improvement measures
reported in the Health Outcome Survey (HOS). Panel (e) and (f) look at measures of managing diabetes and
blood pressure from the Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS). Event study graphs
show 95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors clustered at the level of contracts.
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Figure B17: Within-contract correlations between risk scores and overall star ratings














low high high−selection 4.5+














low high high−selection 4.5+














low high high−selection 4.5+














low high high−selection 4.5+
Notes. Figure plots the distribution of correlation coefficients between overall star ratings in year t and
risk scores in year t − 3 (panel a), t − 2 (panel b), t − 1 (panel c), and year t (panel d). The coefficients are
calculated within contracts over time, grouped by the baseline contract quality. The middle line represents
the median coefficient. The lower and upper edges of the box bound the 25th-75th percentile. The antennas
reach the nearest observations outside. The plus (+) marks the mean coefficient.
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Figure B18: Effect on Part D premium, within-contract variation over health-adjusted
diabetes prevalence rates, high-selection and higher-rated contracts (≥4.5
stars), event study
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Notes. Figure plots the raw trends of Part D premiums in the left panels and event study estimates of the
within-contract variation over county differences in health-adjusted diabetes prevalence rates in the right
panels. The health-adjusted prevalence rate multiplies the raw prevalence rate by the coding-adjusted
county risk score. We restrict within-contract locations to counties in the lower and upper 15% of baseline
prevalence rates in the contract’s service area. We restrict high-quality contracts to higher-rated contracts
(4.5 stars and above), and plot the price levels across the 15% tails within an average low-quality contract
(dotted lines) and an average higher-rated, high-selection contract (solid lines) below the median service
area risk (0.975) in panel (a), and below the 25th percentile (0.902) in panel (c). Corresponding event study
estimates in panel (b) and (d) show the within-contract variation over county differences in continuous
prevalence rates. Plotted 95% confidence intervals are based on robust standard errors clustered two-way at
the level of counties and contracts.
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Figure B19: Effect on Part D premium, within-contract variation over health-adjusted
hypertension prevalence rates, high-selection and higher-rated contracts
(≥4.5 stars), event study
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Notes. Figure plots the raw trends of Part D premiums in the left panels and event study estimates of the
within-contract variation over county differences in health-adjusted hypertension prevalence rates in the
right panels. The health-adjusted prevalence rate multiplies the raw prevalence rate by the coding-adjusted
county risk score. We restrict within-contract locations to counties in the lower and upper 15% of baseline
prevalence rates in the contract’s service area. We restrict high-quality contracts to higher-rated contracts
(4.5 stars and above), and plot the price levels across the 15% tails within an average low-quality contract
(dotted lines) and an average higher-rated, high-selection contract (solid lines) below the median service
area risk (0.975) in panel (a), and below the 25th percentile (0.902) in panel (c). Corresponding event study
estimates in panel (b) and (d) show the within-contract variation over county differences in continuous
prevalence rates. Plotted 95% confidence intervals are based on robust standard errors clustered two-way at
the level of counties and contracts.
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Figure B20: Effects of selection on the quality rating and overpayments, synthetic con-
trol
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Notes. Figure shows the effect of adjusting risk selection on the overall star ratings of high-selection contracts
in panel (a) and on the payments to these contracts in panel (b). Panel (a) plots for each overall star rating
level in 2014 (horizontal axis) the percentage of enrollees receiving lower (by 1 star or 0.5 star) or higher (by
0.5 star or unchanged) star ratings upon adjustment for selected risk scores. Different from the main analysis,
we estimate the risk score change for each high-quality contract using a weighted average of low-quality
contracts as the synthetic control (Abadie et al., 2010). The adjustment holds the risk composition at the
2010 level (corresponding to 2012 rating), and re-calculates the star rating discarding the effect of selected
risk scores since 2011. Based on the changes in panel (a), panel (b) shows changes in the payments across
2014 star ratings. We assume that contracts receiving a downgrade (upgrade) in the star rating adjust
bids downward (upward) relative to the new benchmarks such that rebates to enrollees remain unchanged.
The behavioral assumption is supported by our empirical analysis of bidding and pricing strategies at the
contract level. Overpayments are the amount saved when the effect of selected risk scores since 2011 is





This section documents the construction of the estimation sample from administrative
datasets provided by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). The basis
of the analysis is the roster file of all Medicare Advantage plans, also known as the
landscape file, which provides information on the plan’s issuer, plan name and ID, and
across the plan’s service area, premium and prescription drug coverage (if any) at the
county level. The roster file does not include plans in the Program of All-Inclusive
Care for the Elderly (PACE plans), Special Needs Plans, Part B only plans, Medicaid
plans, or employer-sponsored Medicare Advantage plans. Annual files from 2009 to 2014
can be downloaded at https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Prescription-Drug-Coverage/
PrescriptionDrugCovGenIn/index.html?redirect=/PrescriptionDrugCovGenIn/.
We exclude from the samples Regional Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) Plans,
which follow a different bidding process than the rest of Medicare Advantage plans. We
also exclude plans that do not offer integrated prescription drug coverage. We obtain
separate Part C (for Medicare Part A and B coverage) and Part D (prescription drug)
premium from the Premium Source File, available in a separate folder for year 2009-2012
at the url above. The first three columns in Appendix Table C1 summarize the number
of plan-county observations in the raw files, and the remaining sample after dropping
regional PPOs and Part C only plans.
Payments to plans and rebates to enrollees are available at https:
//www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Advantage/Plan-Payment/Plan-Payment-
Data.html?DLSort=0&DLEntries=10&DLPage=1&DLSortDir=ascending. We observe
bids and rebates for plans bidding below the benchmark. We do not directly observe the
plan-specific benchmark, but infer the benchmark from the rebate formula. Also available
is the Part C risk score used to adjust Medicare Advantage benchmarks and payments.
The risk score is calculated from a hierarchical model that accounts for the severity of
conditions and the interaction of conditions from multiple diagnoses. Plans with missing
payment information and risk scores are dropped from the sample.
Moreover, in the Quality Bonus demonstration, star rating in year t-1 is used to
adjust bonus payments in year t. Payments to plans without a quality rating in the
previous year are subject to a different set of rules. For continuing contracts with
missing quality data due to small enrollments, a fixed star rating is applied to all such
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contracts to determine benchmark and rebate bonuses.52 Since the incentive structure is
generally different from that of rated contracts in the same year, we drop contract-year
observations where the payment-relevant quality rating is missing. This affects a tiny
fraction of the estimation sample, since the vast majority of baseline contracts rated 3.0
stars and above continue to receive quality ratings over the sample period.53 Data on
measure ratings and overall ratings are available at https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/
Prescription-Drug-Coverage/PrescriptionDrugCovGenIn/PerformanceData.html.
The crosswalk file linking plans and contracts over time is available at
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-
Trends-and-Reports/MCRAdvPartDEnrolData/Plan-Crosswalks.html.
We merge in enrollment counts at the plan-year-county level from monthly
enrollment counts from https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/MCRAdvPartDEnrolData/Monthly-
Enrollment-by-Contract-Plan-State-County.html. Annual enrollment sums
over enrollee-months over a 12-month period. However, exact counts are masked
for counties with fewer than 10 enrollees. We include the full range of service areas
when constructing the within-contract variation in county characteristics, but exclude
county-plans with missing enrollments when aggregating prices to the county-contract
level. These missing enrollments affect about one-fourth of the county-contract prices.
Results are similar without dropping low-enrollment county-plans.
In the difference-in-differences analysis, we summarize the location variation using
service area variables at the contract level, and drop the duplicate observations by location.
We end up with a little over 1,000 plans each year, for a total of 6,789 plan-year obser-
vations from 2009-2014. These plans are offered by 406 distinct contracts, of which 244
continued from the baseline in 2009-2010. For these baseline contracts, 65 achieved at
least a 4.0 star overall rating in 2009 or 2010. 149 are rated at least 3.0 stars but less than
4.0 stars in both years. The remaining contracts have at least one rating below 3.0 stars.
These contracts are subject to cancellation after three consecutive ratings below 3.0 stars.
We do not include the last set of lowest-rated contracts in the analysis.
In the triple-difference analysis, we consider a range of county characteristics to under-
stand the within-contract variation in prices. Details of the county variables are provided
52In 2012, a uniform 3.0 star rating is applied to benchmark bonuses in such cases. The rebate bonus
is uniformly set at the level of 4.5 stars. New contracts do not receive a star rating in the first three years.
Instead, a weighted average of existing contracts offered by the organization is used to impute a star rating
for payment purposes.
53Less than 1% of the rated contracts in year t have missing star ratings in t + 1 in the estimation sample.
Less than 4% of the baseline contracts have a missing star rating in 2011-2014. Dropping these contracts
from the estimation sample gives very similar results.
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Table C1: Construction of the estimation sample
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Landscape File observations 99,147 66,674 36,689 40,637 39,548 31,784
Contract observations 539 495 413 463 461 473
Dropping Regional PPOs -6,181 -7,883 -7,497 -6,877 -6,171 -6,317
Dropping Part C only plans -42.867 -22.489 -9,674 -10,550 -9,423 -6,343
Plan-county observations 50,099 36,302 19,518 23,210 23,954 19,156
Contract observations 514 470 391 443 442 455
Missing payment/risk score -2,449 -2,129 -2,899 -3,819 -3,709 -3,090
Missing quality star -21,987 -15,078 -6,712 -5,314 -3,915 -1,426
Plan-county observations 25,663 19,095 9,907 14,077 16,330 14,640
Plan observations 1,183 1,092 829 1,090 1,246 1,349
Contract observations 244 234 248 313 333 336
Linked contract observations 406
Continuing from baseline 244
baseline below 3.0 stars 54
baseline low quality 135
baseline high quality 55
high-selection (<50% FFS risk) 27
≥4.5 stars 19
≥4.5 stars, <50% FFS risk 11
Notes: Table shows the step-by-step construction of the estimation sample from yearly Landscape Files. The main
analysis further excludes contracts with less than 3.0 star rating in either year of 2009-2010. Counts of distinct




County fee-for-service (FFS) risk scores and costs are from the Medicare Geo-
graphic Variation Public Use File at https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-
Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/Medicare-Geographic-
Variation/GV_PUF.html. We use the 2009-2010 average for the baseline. The
risk scores are calculated from the same Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) model
that generates Medicare Advantage risk scores. Payments to providers in the FFS Medicare
are adjusted for the case-mix of patient conditions coded in the risk score. We use the
differences in FFS risks scores as measures of potential gains from selection for Medicare
Advantage insurers across the service area.
Three variables measure the cost of medical practices in the FFS program. The first,
unadjusted cost is calculated as the total Part A and Part B claim costs of medical practices
divided by the number of beneficiaries attributed to the practices. The second measure
adjusts the raw average cost by local price factors outside the physician’s control. Specifi-
cally, a national payment scheme is applied to override state-specific fee schedules, and
input prices such as labor and facility costs are standardized at the national level.54 The
price-standardized cost is further adjusted for patient case-mixes in the third, risk-adjusted
cost measure, which captures local costs of medical practices holding fixed both prices and
risk. The adjustments reveal the relevant component in costs which relates to the variation
in prices. The first four rows of Appendix Table C2 summarizes the FFS risk scores and
costs by county.
Table C2: Summary of county characteristics
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Health Risks and Costs mean s.e. N Socio-Economic Factors mean s.e. N
FFS risk score 0.96 0.002 1,465 Per capita income (k) 31.87 0.20 1,450
Per capita FFS Cost (k) 8.40 0.035 1,465 Per capita transfer income (k) 7.33 0.039 1,450
price adjusted (k) 8.08 0.031 1,465 Non-White (%) 11.85 0.36 1,465
price-risk adjusted (k) 8.62 0.023 1,465 Some college (%) 37.68 0.27 1,465
Diabetes (%) 8.88 0.056 1,465 HHI 0.55 0.005 1,461
Hypertension (%) 37.68 0.13 1,465 Low-quality HHI 0.76 0.007 1,164
Hospital re-admission (%) 17.86 0.070 1,462 High-quality HHI 0.88 0.009 502
Preventable hospitalization (%) 7.05 0.065 1,454
Notes: Table summarizes the baseline characteristics of counties in the estimation sample. Counties with missing data of the characteristics
are not included. Quality-specific HHIs are only calculated for counties where enrollment in the measured quality is positive in the baseline.
54More details of the price adjustments are available at http://www.qualitynet.org/dcs/
ContentServer?c=Page&pagename=QnetPublic%2FPage%2FQnetTier4&cid=1228772057350.
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Diabetes prevalence rates by county are available from the Center of Disease Control
(CDC) at https://gis.cdc.gov/grasp/diabetes/DiabetesAtlas.html#. The estimates
are based on reported diagnoses from adults over age 20 in the Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance System (BRFSS). We multiply the age-adjusted estimate, which gives the
prevalence rate in a standard-age population, by the FFS risk score to account for differ-
ences in health conditions: prevalence is adjusted upward in locations where individuals
have more diagnoses in the risk score. We apply the diagnosis intensity factors developed
in Finkelstein et al. (2017) to the FFS risk scores. The resulting prevalence rate accounts
for age, risk, and coding differences across counties.
County hypertension prevalence rates are published by the Institute for
Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) for adults over age 30 in 2001-2009
(http://ghdx.healthdata.org/record/ihme-data/united-states-hypertension-
estimates-county-2001-2009). We use the 2009 value for the baseline. The prevalence
rate is calculated as the percent of respondents having systolic blood pressure above 140
mm Hg or taking anti-hypertensive medication in the National Health and Nutrition
Examination Survey (NHANES) and the BRFSS. The estimates correct for self-report
and coding biases, standardized using national age-race distributions. Details of the
construction are provided in Olives et al. (2013).
Data on hospital re-admission rate and preventable hospital stays are taken from the
Area Health Resources File (AHRF, available at https://data.hrsa.gov/topics/health-
workforce/ahrf). We use the 2010 variables for the baseline. The re-admission rate calcu-
lates the percent of re-admitted patients within 30 days of discharge from an acute hospital.
The measure is associated with the access to and the quality of inpatient care. Preventable
hospital stay calculates the percent of hospital discharge of outpatient treatable conditions
in the FFS population. Higher rate indicates lower quality of outpatient care.
County demographic data come from the Survey of Epidemiology and End Results
(SEER, available at https://www.nber.org/data/seer_u.s._county_population_data.
html), which provides population estimates by age groups and race. We focus on the
elderly (65+) population and the White vs. non-White categories. Percent with col-
lege education is calculated from the American Community Survey (ACS) micro data
(Ruggles et al., 2019). Per capita income and transfer income are from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (https://www.bea.gov/data/income-saving/personal-income-
county-metro-and-other-areas), where transfer income includes social security, un-
employment insurance, disability, medical and income assistance payments from gov-
ernments, nonprofit organizations, and businesses. Finally, we calculate the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) from contract market shares. The denominator of the market
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share is the sum of member-month enrollments in all rated contracts in a county. We
calculate the quality-specific HHI for markets at the level of county-quality pairs.
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D Distributional Impacts: Additional Evidence
Following the discussion in Section 7.2, we provide additional evidence on premium and
market share changes in the upper and lower 15% tails of county risk. We focus on the
extreme tails of county risk because the within-contract variation tends to imply decreasing
(increasing) premium in very low-risk (high-risk) counties. In the intermediate range of
county risk, premium can either increase or decrease depending on the within-contract
ranking of county risks and the distribution of contracts across counties.
Table E1 estimates the effect on premiums separately for the two risk tails.55 We expect
the effects to be asymmetric since high-quality contracts in the lower risk tail are predomi-
nantly high-selection contracts,56 whereas in the upper risk tail, high-selection contracts
account for only 10% of the high-quality sample. Consistent with larger within-contract
variation in high-selection contracts, high-quality premiums decreased significantly with
county risk in the lower tail (column 2), but not by much in the highest-risk counties
(column 5). Figure E1 shows the event study.
Table E2 estimates the premium variation over pooled county risk scores across 15%
tails in column 1-3, and the effects on market shares in column 4-6. These estimates under-
lie the diverging patterns of market shares shown in Figure 10. We focus on high-selection
contracts in the table. Premiums in high-selection contracts increased significantly with
county risk scores, with larger increases in the lower risk tail. The increase in low-quality
premiums is negligible. In both quality, market shares decreased with county risk, and
decreased much more in high-quality contracts. Moving from the bottom 15% to the top
15% risk tail increases high-quality premiums relative to low-quality by $6.51 after the
QBP demonstration, and decreases high-quality market shares by 12.96 percentage points.
Figure E2 shows the event study.
D.1 Contemporaneous Quality
Estimating aggregate effects using a sample of continuing contracts and their baseline
ratings can be problematic for two reasons. First, future ratings of continuing ratings
55We use the specification
yclt = β0 · riskl · highc · postt + β1 · riskl · postt + β2 · highc · postt + β3 · highc · riskl
+ β ·Xlt +αc +γl + τt + clt
where outcomes vary at the level of contract (c), county (l) and year (t). riskl is the county risk score.
56Counties in the lower 15% tail (risk scores below 0.872) are included in the service area of 31 high-quality
contracts and 57 low-quality contracts. Of the 981 contract-county-year observations in the high-quality
sample, 903 are contributed by high-selection contracts.
66
Table E1: Premium variation over county risk scores, lower and upper 15% risk tails
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Risk · High · Post 71.47 44.05
(93.52) (37.27)
Risk · Post 59.94 134.74** 58.77 -29.16* 20.28 -32.23**
(85.75) (54.83) (77.81) (15.03) (31.51) (14.88)
High · Post -53.14 -55.93
(82.43) (52.23)
Risk · High -54.81 -107.69*
(94.79) (59.36)
Counties <15% risk >85% risk
Contracts low high all low high all
y mean 49.75 93.63 67.73 40.11 72.45 47.03
R2 0.83 0.82 0.86 0.81 0.76 0.80
N 1,264 981 2,293 3,883 1,057 4,946
Notes: Table estimates the premium variation over county risk scores in the lower 15% risk tail
(<0.87205) in column 1-3, and in the upper 15% risk tail (>1.0295) in column 4-6. Standard errors
clustered two-way at the level of contracts and counties in the parenthesis.
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Figure E1: Premium variation over county risk scores, lower and upper 15% risk tails
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Notes. Figure plots the event study estimates of the premium variation over county risk scores in the lower
15% risk tail (<0.87205) in panel (a), and in the upper 15% risk tail (>1.0295) in panel (b). In each panel,
the dotted lines on the left (right) plot the variation over time for low- (high-) quality contracts, and the
solid line in the middle shows the differential effect on high-quality contracts. 95% confidence intervals are
plotted based on robust standard errors clustered two-way at the level of contracts and counties.
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Notes. Figure plots the event study estimates of the variation in premiums (panel a) and market shares
(panel b) over county risk scores across the 15% risk tails (below 0.87205 or over 1.0295). We restrict
high-quality contracts to the high-selection contracts below the median service area risk (0.975) of high
quality. 95% confidence intervals are plotted based on robust standard errors clustered two-way at the level
of contracts and counties.
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Table E2: Effect on premiums and market shares across the 15% risk tails
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Premium Market Share
Risk · High · Post 56.64 -0.61**
(36.57) (0.30)
Risk · Post 0.58 65.89* 0.41 -0.51*** -0.93** 0.53***
(0.95) (35.52) (9.79) (0.089) (0.36) (0.084)
High · Post -43.99 0.62**
(36.55) (0.31)
Risk · High -109.54* -0.10
(60.01) (0.53)
Counties 15% tails 15% tails
Contracts low high + all low high + all
Service area risk <50% <50%
y mean 42.48 94.31 50.68 0.27 0.53 0.31
R2 0.72 0.81 0.75 0.36 0.63 0.40
N 5,151 1,011 6,213 5,151 1,011 6,213
Notes: Table estimates the variation in premiums (column 1-3) and market shares (column 4-6)
over county risk scores across the 15% risk tails (below 0.87205 or over 1.0295). We restrict
high-quality contracts to the high-selection contracts below the median service area risk (0.975)
of high quality. Standard errors clustered two-way at the level of contracts and counties in the
parenthesis.
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can differ from the baseline values. Second, contracts initially missing star ratings – such
as new contracts – are not included in the analysis even if most obtain quality ratings
later in the sample period. This section shows that the aggregate effects are robust to
using contemporaneous quality ratings in the estimation sample and in the full sample of
Medicare Advantage contracts. We first show results in the estimation sample.
D.1.1 Estimation Sample
Figure E3 shows the market share changes when high and low quality are defined using
contemporaneous ratings. In the lower 15% risk tail (gray lines), high-quality market
shares narrowed with and overtook low-quality market shares during the sample period.
At the same time, low-quality market shares increased substantially in the upper risk tail
(dotted lines). By comparison, high-quality market shares increased more in the lower risk
tail, although the difference is not statistically significant. Table E3 shows the estimated
effects.
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Notes. Figure plots the raw trends (panel a) and the event study estimates (panel b) of market shares by
high and low quality based on contemporaneous ratings. Contracts receiving a 4.0 star rating or above are
classified as high quality. We construct the quality-level market shares in a balanced panel of county-quality-
years where counties with masked enrollment data in some but not all years receive zero market shares in
years missing enrollments. The raw trends in panel (a) plot the levels of market shares across the 15% tails
of county risk scores (below 0.8523 or above 1.0225). Event study estimates in panel (b) show variation in
markets shares over continuous risk scores across the 15% tails. 95% confidence intervals are plotted based
on robust standard errors clustered at the level of counties.
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Table E3: Effects on market shares, contemporaneous quality
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Risk · High · Post -0.21*** -0.14***
(0.032) (0.035)
Risk · Post 0.15*** -0.037** 0.16*** 0.12*** -0.0031 0.13***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.019)
High · Post 0.25*** 0.19***
(0.030) (0.033)
Risk · High -0.16*** -0.17***
(0.022) (0.025)
Counties all 15% tails
Contracts <4.0 ≥4.0 all <4.0 ≥4.0 all
y mean 0.12 0.050 0.086 0.13 0.049 0.088
R2 0.62 0.69 0.40 0.62 0.68 0.43
N 17,236 17,236 34,508 5,070 5,070 10,164
Notes: Table estimates the variation in market shares by high and low quality over county risk scores.
Quality-level market shares are based on contemporaneous ratings, and contracts with a 4.0 star
rating and above are classified as high quality. We construct market shares for a balanced panel of
quality-county-years where counties with masked enrollment data in some but not all years receive
zero market shares in years with missing enrollments. Column 1-3 are estimated over the full sample
of counties. Column 4-6 restrict counties to those in the 15% tails of county risk scores (below 0.8523
or above 1.0225). Robust standard errors clustered at the level of counties in the parenthesis.
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D.1.2 Full Sample of MA Contracts
For a comprehensive view of the quality distribution in the Medicare Advantage market,
this section constructs market shares using all contracts listed in the Landscape Files. The
key difference from the estimation sample is that regional Preferred Provider Organization
(PPO) plans, Part-C only plans, and contracts with missing quality ratings are retained
in this sample. We define high-quality status as having at least a 4.0 star rating in the
contemporaneous rating, and construct high-quality market shares for county-years with
at least one Medicare Advantage plan listed in the Landscape Files.
Table E4: Effects on high-quality market shares, contempo-
raneous quality
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Risk · Post -0.84*** -0.073 -0.16*** -0.037***
(0.27) (0.12) (0.048) (0.013)
Risk continuous county risk scores >85%
Counties <15% >85% 15% tails 15% tails
y mean 0.19 0.13 0.16 0.16
R2 0.50 0.65 0.54 0.54
N 2,410 2,639 5,049 5,049
Notes: Table estimates the change in the high-quality market share
where quality is defined using the contemporaneous ratings. Contracts
receiving a 4.0 star rating and above are classified as high quality. High-
quality market shares are constructed from contract enrollments for
county-years with at least one Medicare Advantage plan listed in the
Landscape Files. We restrict counties to the bottom 15% of county risk
scores (below 0.8597) in column 1, and to the top 15% county risk scores
(above 1.0233) in column 2. Column 3-4 estimate market share changes
over pooled county risk across the 15% tails. In column 4, the variable
Risk is a binary indicator of the top 15% tail, and the estimate gives the
discrete change in the high-quality market share when moving from
the bottom to the top 15% risk tail. Robust standard errors clustered at
the level of counties in the parenthesis.
Table E4 shows that high-quality market share decreased significantly with county risk
across the 15% risk tails: a ten percentage point increase in the county risk score lowered
high-quality market share by 1.6 percentage points (column 3). Moving from the bottom
to the top 15% risk tail, high-quality market share decreased by 3.7 percentage points
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(column 4). By contrast, the corresponding estimate in the estimation sample is small and
insignificant (column 5 of Table E3), suggesting that much of the effect in the full sample
is driven by new contracts receiving higher quality ratings in lower-risk counties. In the
bottom risk tail, high-quality market shares decreased by 8.4 percentage points per ten
percentage point increase in county risk score (column 1), driving the average effect across
15% tails.
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Notes. Figure plots the raw trends (panel a) and the event study estimates (panel b) of high-quality market
shares based on contemporaneous ratings. Contracts with at least a 4.0 star rating are classified as high
quality. High-quality market shares are aggregated from contract enrollments for county-years with at least
one Medicare Advantage plan listed in the Landscape Files. The raw trends plot high-quality market shares
in the bottom (below 0.8597) and the top (above 1.0233) 15% tails of county risk scores, respectively. The
event study plots the yearly effects over pooled risk scores across the 15% tails, showing variations over
continuous risk scores on the left, and discrete changes in high-quality market shares when moving from the
bottom to the top 15% risk tail on the right. 95% confidence intervals are plotted based on robust standard
errors clustered at the level of counties.
Figure E4 shows that the growth of high-quality market share accelerated in low-risk
counties in 2012-2014 (panel a). By 2014, moving from the bottom to the top risk counties
would decrease high-quality share by as much as 17.3 percentage points (panel b). The dip
in 2011 reflects the rating computation change when the overall star rating combining the
Part C and Part D ratings was first introduced. The new rating requires a larger number of
measure-level ratings, some of which cannot be computed due to insufficient data supplied
by small-enrollment contracts. The disruption is not visible in the estimation sample
(Figure E3) and does not affect the main analysis of continuing contracts differentiated by
baseline quality ratings.
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